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THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AD HOC
RWANDA TRIBUNAL:
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE OR
JURIDICALLY-CONSTRUCTED
"VICTOR'S IMPUNITY"?
PROF. PETER ERLINDER 1
... if the Japanese had won the war, those of us who planned
the fire-bombing of Tokyo would have been the war
criminals..."2
Robert S. McNamara, U.S. Secretary of State
... and so it goes...-3
Billy Pilgrim (alter ego of a German prisoner
of war who survived the Allied firebombing
of Dresden in the cellar of an abattoir,
author Kurt Vonnegut Jr.)
1 President ICTR-ADAD (Association des Avocats de la Defence), Arusha,
Tanzania; ICTR Lead Defence Counsel, Prosecutor v. Ntabakuze (ICTR Mil-
itary-I Trial); Past-Pres., National Lawyers Guild, New York, NY; Prof. of
Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, MN; Director, International
Humanitarian Law Institute, St. Paul, MN.
2 THE FOG OF WAR: ELEVEN LESSONS FROM THE LIFE OF ROBERT S.
MCNAMARA (Sony Pictures Classics 2003). This 2004 Academy Award win-
ning documentary film by director Errol Morris records McNamara's voice-
over to the opening scene of newsreels showing Tokyo ablaze from U.S.
napalm bombs that incinerated some 250,000 civilians before atomic bombs
were dropped on the civilian populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
3 KURT VONNEGUT, JR., SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE or The Children's Cru-
sade: A Duty-Dance with Death (1969). This phrase was used throughout
the novel in the face of senseless death. Vonnegut was a prisoner of war in
Dresden during the Allied napalm bombing in which more German civilians
died than were killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
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AUTHOR'S NOTE: On Friday morning May 28, 2010, as I was
finishing a morning cappuccino and croissant before leaving for
the airport, agents of Rwanda's secret police surrounded my table
and politely suggested I accompany them.., somewhere. Why? I
had no idea. But, I was now in the hands of Rwanda's dictatorial
President, Paul Kagame.4
I had arrived five days earlier to consult with would-be
Presidential candidate Victoire Ingabire, who had been briefly
jailed for "genocide denial." Her supposed "crime" was asking
why genocide memorials did not mention Hutu victims even
though both the U.N. and Rwandan government both
acknowledged that both Hutus and Tutsis had died.
Paul Rusesabagina, the 2005 U.S. Medal of Freedom recipient
from President George Bush and the main figure in the award
winning film Hotel Rwanda, had told me as I left Belgium that
Kagame had threatened him, and that he could not go home. But,
I had immunity as a U.N. Tribunal defense lawyer and planned to
do no more than meet with the U.S. Embassy and U.N. Office,
Rwandan officials and consult with my prospective client.
Rwanda's President Paul Kagame, had an unsavory reputation
for rumored assassinations and jailing opponents, but he had
never arrested an American lawyer and, in late 2009, Bill Clinton
had given Kagame a "human rights" award and declared "things
have changed in Rwanda!" With the 2010 Rwandan elections
approaching, Kagame's new image had been burnished by an
honorary MIT degree, Tony Blair signing-on as a consultant,
and Rwanda's 2009 admission to the British Commonwealth.
But, as I was being taken away by Kagame's secret police, I
realized I had put far too much faith in Clinton's public embrace
of Kagame and an effective public relations campaign.
4 See Josh Kron & Jeffrey Gettleman, American Lawyer for Opposition
Figure is Arrested in Rwanda, N. Y. TIMEs, May 29, 2010, at A9. See also,
Prosecutor v. Ntabakuze, Case No. ICTR-98-41-A, Decision on Motion for
Injunction Prohibiting Prosecution of Defense Counsel Professor Peter
Erlinder (Oct. 6, 2010).
Volume +, Number I Fall 2010
3
Erlinder: The UN Security Council Ad Hoc Rwanda Tribunal: International Jus
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice 15+
After a week of sleeping on a concrete floor and trying to
convince AK-47-armed 16-year old guards to allow me to live by
buying food and water from street vendors, I finally learned that
my "crime" had been earning the acquittal of my U.N. Tribunal
client through original U.N. documents that showed the defeated
army had not conspired to commit a "long-planned genocide," as
Kagame had claimed, and then writing articles about the meaning
of the acquittal.
A worldwide, "Internet-peoples' campaign" pressured the U.S.
and Rwandan governments to release me in slightly less than a
month, on humanitarian health grounds (together with the brave,
skilled representation of my Kenyan lawyers Ken Ogetto and
Gershom Otachi, with support from U.S. lawyer Kurt Kerns). On
October 6, 2010, the U.N. Tribunal issued an injunction against
the Rwandan government, ordering that the pending prosecution
against me be dismissed as illegal under principles of UN-ICTR
defense counsel immunity.5
However, Rwanda's Chief Prosecutor has threatened to pursue a
second prosecution that will avoid U.N. immunity protections.6 I
remain at risk of arrest under Rwanda-issued INTERPOL
5 See Bagasora, Ntabakuze, Nsengiyumva v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-
41-A, Decision on Aloys Ntabakuze's Motion for Injunctions against the
Government of Rwanda Regarding the Arrest and Investigation of Lead
Counsel Peter Erlinder (Oct. 6, 2010).
6 Edmund Kagire, Rwanda: we will not drop Erlinder's case, Prosecutor, THE
NEw TIMES (Oct. 28, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201010280192.html.
According to Prosecutor General, Martin Ngoga, Erlinder
[ ... ] will be summoned back to the country to answer charges
after he was released on bail on medical grounds in June.
"You may also recall that few days ago the ICTR ruled that he
doesn't have immunity when it comes to publications and
statements that he does out of the scope of his duties in the
defence council of his clients at the ICTR," said Ngoga. "That
his arrest here was not in breach of his functional immunity
because he was not on ICTR business. That is the development
that paved the way for us to pursue the case against him."
Ngoga dismissed recent allegations by Erlinder that he fears for
his life. Erlinder earlier this week issued a statement that he
Volume +, Number I rall 2010
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1 5 RWANDA TRIBUNAL
warrants and have learned from exiled former members of the
government that, at a high-level meeting in Kigali in mid-October
2010, Kagame has complained that my release was "a mistake"
and ordered that I be brought back to Rwanda "dead or alive."
This article summarizes how my U.N. work made me an "enemy
of the Rwandan state" and explains why original U.N. documents
in evidence at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, as
well as more recent development including the 600 page U.N.
report of Rwanda's genocidal crimes in the Congo 1993-2003
leaked to the world press by LeMonde and the New York Times
in late August 2010,7 require a re-assessment of the "Rwanda-
genocide" narrative.
INTRODUCTION
The precedent for the U.N. Security Council tribunals, estab-
lished in the mid-1990's to prosecute individuals allegedly com-
plicit in international crimes, 8 were the post-World War II
Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals created by the vic-
torious Allies to prosecute the leadership of Japan and Ger-
many.9 However, unlike the WWII Tribunals, the U.N. Security
fears he could be poisoned or he could disappear if he returned
to Rwanda."
7 Jason Stearns, Bombshell UN Report Leaked: 'Crimes of Genocide' Against
Hutus in Congo, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.
csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2010/0826/Bombshell-UN-
report-leaked-Crimes-of-genocide-against-Hutus-in-Congo.
8 The elements of these crimes are defined in the Security Council "statutes"
under which each tribunal has been established. See, e.g., Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
9 The UN Charter does not mention the establishment of such tribunals, ei-
ther as freestanding entities or within the powers of the Security Council,
leading to jurisdictional challenges to many of the early ICTY and ICTR
prosecutions. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadie, Case No. IT-94-1-I (Int'l Crim.
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995); Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi,
Case No. ICTR-96-15 (Int'l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda June 3, 1999). However,
the Security Council tribunals have justified their own existence by relying on
Volumel+, Number 1 rall.Zolo
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Council tribunals for the former Yugoslavia ° (ICTY) and
Rwanda" (ICTR) were ostensibly untarnished by the taint of
"victor's justice" that could not be avoided by their WW-II pre-
cursors. 12 But, despite having been established by a presumably
"neutral" U.N. body,' 3 rather than the victors in war, the ICTR
has become the only international tribunal in history mandated
with prosecuting both sides in a war that has failed to fulfill its
mandate and has prosecuted only the vanquished. 14
Human Rights Watch rightfully observes that the ICTR his-
tory of one-sided prosecution threatens the Tribunal's historical
legacy15 for a wide range of reasons. First, it falsifies history and
creates a completely unreliable jurisprudence that has been
manipulated to fit a pre-determined outcome. 16 Moreover, the
UN Charter Chapter VII, which grants the Security Council "peace-making"
authority. See ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GORAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 329 (Oxford University Press, 2008) (discussing jurisdictional
arguments).
10 See Resolution establishing an International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, supra note 8.
11 See United Nations Security County Resolution establishing an Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc S/Res/955
(Nov. 8, 1994).
12 That the Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals failed to consider the fire-
bombing of Dresden or Tokyo, much less the use of atomic weapons on civil-
ians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or other possible war crimes committed by
the victorious Allies, is beyond the scope of this paper. But the commission
of "crimes" by all participants in WW-II is beyond dispute, irrespective of the
asserted justification for their commission.
13 The legitimacy of the UN tribunals have been criticized because neither
the UN Charter nor the General Assembly has specifically authorized the
establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals or the appointment of a prosecutor by
the Security Council to act on behalf of the UN proper. See INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 9, at 25-40.
14 See infra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
15 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY: A DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (January 15, 2010), available at http://
www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/O1/12/genocide-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-
humanity.
16 See infra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
Volume+1-, Number 1 Fall 2-010
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ICTR's one-sided prosecution threatens the legitimacy of the
ICTR and calls into question all of its findings, because prose-
cuting only the vanquished military and government must mean
either: (a) the war that raged in Rwanda between 1990-94 is the
only war in history in which only the vanquished committed
crimes, or, (b) the ICTR has become a victors' tribunal, like Nu-
remberg and Tokyo, without public acknowledgment that this is
the case.
Fortunately, former ICTR Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte 17
and her deputy, Florence Hartmann, 18 have provided the defini-
tive and historically comforting answer: the Rwanda War is not
historically anomalous and is not the only war in history in
which only the vanquished committed crimes. The memoirs de-
scribes precisely how Del Ponte was fired from her UN-ICTR
post by the U.S. State Department in 2003 because she refused
U.S. orders to drop prosecutions against the victorious invaders
from Uganda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its leader
Paul Kagame, for "Rwanda genocide" crimes.19 These memoirs
also describes how, despite U.S. manipulation of the Tribunal,
the Ntabakuze Defense Team in the Military-I Trial20gained ac-
17 See CARLA DEL PONTE & CHUCK SUDETIC, MADAME PROSECUTOR:
CONFRONTATIONS WITH HUMANITY'S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CUL-
TURE OF IMPUNITY (2009).
18 See FLORENCE HARTMANN, PAIX ET CHATIMENT, LES GUERRES SECRtTES
DE LA POLITIQUE ET DE LA JUSTICE INTERNATIONALS (2007).
19 See generally MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17; HARTMANN, supra
note 18.
20 Prosecutor v. Th6oneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze
and Anatole Nsengiyumva, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Feb 9, 2009) [all docu-
ments referring to this trial will hereinafter be referred to as part of the Mili-
tary-I Trial]. The author is Lead Counsel of the Defense Team for Major
Aloys Ntabakuze, former commander of the Paracommando Battalion of the
Forces Armee des Rwandais (FAR) an elite unit charged with defending the
Kigali airport, the most militarily-strategic site in the land-locked country.
The Team consists of Co-counsel Me. Andre Tremblay, Montreal, Me. San-
drine Gaillot, Paris and New York, and Joseph Holmes, Esq. London.
Rwandan investigators for the Team were Juvenal Baragahoranye and
Emilien Dusabe, whose courage and dedication made it possible to locate
Volume-, Number I fwall 2010
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cess to original U.N. documents that had been suppressed since
1994, to explain what actually happened during the "Rwandan
genocide" rather than what the victors say happened, after the
fact.21
As a result, the supposed "architects of the Rwandan geno-
cide," including my client former Major Aloys Ntabakuze, were
acquitted of "planning or conspiracy to commit genocide" and
the highest ranking officer, Brigadier General Gratien Kabiligi,
Chief Rwandan Military Operations, was acquitted of all
charges.22 Del Ponte's memoir describes some of the evidence,
which was more fully developed in the Military-I Trial record,
that compelled the Court to conclude that the "long-planned
conspiracy to commit genocide" was a "victor's myth" unsup-
ported by the evidence, despite the best efforts of the Rwandan
government, the U.N. Security Council, and the U.S. State De-
partment, with the assistance of the U.S. Justice Department
personnel.23
Understanding the extent of U.S. influence over all aspects of
the ICTR, as well as developing a more accurate narrative of the
"Rwandan genocide," itself, is important to grasp the role that
international tribunals play as vehicles for furthering U.S. for-
eign policy. The influence of U.S. policy over every international
witnesses and evidence in Rwanda that far exceeded any reasonable expecta-
tions. Both are now in exile (May 4, 2007).
21 See MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17; HARTMANN, supra note 18.
22 See Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T. Colonel Bagosora, the sup-
posed main ringleader of the genocide conspiracy, was convicted of crimes
committed by others in which he failed to intervene, occurring on April 6-8
only.
23 Several ICTR prosecutors have been drawn from the ranks of the U.S.
Justice Department, including Steven Rapp, former Deputy Chief Prosecutor
under Chief Prosecutor Jallow and current War Crimes Ambassador for the
Obama administration (former U.S. attorney for Northern Iowa), lead Mili-
tary-I Prosecutor Barbara Mulvaney (former assistant U.S. attorney), and
lead Akayesu case Prosecutor and War Crimes Ambassador for the Bush ad-
ministration Pierre-Richard Prosper (former assistant U.S. attorney). See in-
fra note 108 and accompanying text.
Volume+, Number 1 frall 2010
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tribunal in which the Security Council retains an important role
(including the International Criminal Court, of which the U.S. is
not formally a member but exercises influence through the Se-
curity Council),24 is probably better understood by nations vul-
nerable to tribunal justice, or vengeance, than this overarching
U.S. influence is understood, or admitted, within the U.S.25
For example, recently the heads of State of all African
Union 26 nations unanimously refused to cooperate with the In-
ternational Criminal Court27which, in the last analysis, is an ex-
pression of "no confidence" in U.S. foreign policy toward
Africa. 28 As Uganda-born scholar Mahmood Mamdani of Co-
lumbia University explains:
24 An example is the ICC indictment of President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan,
who faces ICC prosecution despite Sudan not being a signatory to the ICC
Treaty, on account of the UN Security Council retaining the power to refer
cases to the ICC. As a result, leaders having positive relations with Perma-
nent Security Council member states have not been referred to the ICC for
prosecution (such as Paul Kagame of Rwanda), while non-state actors and
heads of state without a protector on the Security Council face ICC criminal
charges. See supra Author's note.
25 See Targeting Africa: The Case for and Against the ICC, NEw AFRICAN,
May 2009, at 8.
26 The African Union is an intergovernmental organization founded in 2002.
The AU has 53 members, including Rwanda, and among its objectives is "to
promote and defend common positions on issues of interest to the continent
and its people." See generally, Organization of African Unity, Constitutive
Act of the African Union (July 11, 2000), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/4937e0142.htm.
27 The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a permanent, treaty-based in-
ternational criminal court seated at The Hague, Netherlands. The ICC was
created by the Treaty of Rome, which was enacted in 1998 and ratified in
2002. A member of the UN Security Council may refer matters for prosecu-
tion, without limit to territoriality. Treaty signatories may refer matters
within its territory to the ICC for prosecution. Neither the United States nor
Rwanda is a signatory to the treaty. The United States is a Permanent Mem-
ber of the U.N. Security Council. See Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc A/CONF.183/9 (1998).
28 Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementa-
tion of Decision Assembly/AU/Dec. 270(XIV) on the Second Ministerial
Meeting on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
Doc. Assembly/AU/10(XV), Assembly of the African Union, July 25-27,
Volume+, Number I F a 112-01
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Its name notwithstanding, the [International
Criminal Court] is rapidly turning into a Western
court to try African crimes against humanity. It
has targeted governments that are U.S. adversa-
ries and ignored actions the United States does
not oppose, like those of Uganda and Rwanda, ef-
fectively conferring impunity on them [in the
ICTR].29
This article is intended as an object lesson that reveals the extent
of U.S. "Sole Superpower" influence over seemingly "neutral"
international juridical bodies by using the recent public expo-
sures of the manipulation of the ICTR by the U.S. to conform
with its own policy interests. The article also describes the dev-
astating costs that the United States' use of the ICTR to further
U.S. policy interests has inflicted upon the people of Central
Africa.
Part I of this article30 describes how an American law profes-
sor and a UN-ICTR defense lawyer became a "genocide denier"
and enemy of the RPF ruling party of Rwandan State, without
really trying. Part 1131 examines how the most powerful Perma-
nent U.N. Security Council Members have re-created the ICTR
as a "victor's tribunal" to serve their own policy interests. Part
1132 discusses the long-suppressed U.N. documents that the
Ntabakuze Defense put into the ICTR public record, which re-
sulted in the acquittal of the supposed "architects of the geno-
cide;" Part IV 33 describes the consequences of international
"tribunals" manipulated by the sole superpower, no matter how
pure the intentions, and concludes they are an impediment to
2010 in Kampala, Uganda. See Decisions of the Assembly at http://www.af-
rica-union.org/root/au/conferences/2010/july/summit/15thsummit.html.
29 Mahmood Mamdani, The New Humanitarian Order, THE NATION, Sept.
29, 2008.
30 See infra p. 7.
31 See infra p. 16.
32 See infra p. 23.
33 See infra, p. 51.
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reconciliation between African peoples and a recipe for disaster
for the international justice, and for long-term U.S. interests in
the developing world.
I. How A U.S. ACADEMIC, AND U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS
LAWYER, BECAME AN "ENEMY OF THE RWANDAN
STATE," WITHOUT REALLY TRYING
The standard "Rwanda genocide" narrative, with which most
of the world is familiar,34 can be roughly summarized as follows:
"Hutu hardliners" in the former government of Rwanda had
long-planned the mass murder of Rwanda's Tutsi population.
After the mysterious shooting-down of the Rwandan president's
plane on April 6, 1994, which killed the Presidents of both
Rwanda and Burundi, the long planned "genocide" was put into
effect in 100-days long-planned mass killings. The victims were
either "Tutsi" or "Tutsi and moderate Hutu" (depending on the
version) and the estimated victims ranged from several hundred
thousand, or over a million (also depending on the version).35
The "heroes" of the tale were Gen. Paul Kagame and his RPF
34 See generally, ALISON DES FORGES, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE
NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (1999), available at http:/
/www.grandslacs.net/doc/1317.pdf; PHILLIP GOUREVITCH, WE REGRET TO
INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES
(1998); COLIN WAUGH, PAUL KAGAME AND RWANDA: POWER, GENOCIDE
AND THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (2004).
35 Would-be candidate for Rwanda's presidency, Victoire Ingabire, was
charged with "genocide denial" for questioning the absence of any mention
of Hutu victims of the "genocide," despite public acknowledgement that vic-
tims were both Tutsi and moderate-Hutus in both the U.N. and official
Rwandan government description of the mass violence in 1994. See Rwanda
urged to ensure opposition leader receives fair trial, AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL (April 27, 2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/
rwanda-urged-ensure-opposition-leader-receives-fair-trial-2010-04-28. Re-
cent research indicates that total deaths vary widely. See Filip Reyntjens,
Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship, 103 AFR. AFFAIRS
177 (2004); Christian Davenport & Alan Stain, What Really Happened in
Rwanda, MILLER-MCCUNE (October 6, 2009), http://www.miller-mccune.
com/politics/what-really-happened-in-rwanda-3432.
Volume-, Number I tall 2-010
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troops, who took military control of the country after the 100-
days of long-planned mass violence, and put an end to "the
Genocide."36
Like most people who have only heard the victor's description
of the "Rwandan genocide" narrative, when I first began consid-
ering an appointment as defense counsel at the ICTR in the
summer of 2003 I had no reason to question the "standard nar-
rative." But, soon after I arrived at the Rwanda tribunal in
Arusha Tanzania, Chief ICTR Prosecutor Del Ponte publicly an-
nounced that she intended to prosecute the RPF victors and
their leader Paul Kagame, for mass crimes committed in
Rwanda in 1994. 37 This announcement shattered my former un-
derstanding of the "Rwanda genocide" and called into question
the "standard narrative" upon which it had been based. If Del
Ponte was right, Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda and his
RPF ruling party and army, the widely-trumpeted "heroes" of
the "Rwandan genocide," were war criminals, too.
ICTR Prosecutor in 2003: The "Heroes of the Genocide" are
War Criminals, Too.
When I heard Del Ponte's shocking announcement, I was at
the UN-ICTR and to decide whether I should accept an ap-
pointment to defend one of the accused in the central case at the
tribunal, upon which the entire "Rwanda genocide conspiracy"
hinged. Commonly called Military-I, the top-four officers in the
defeated army (including the alleged "mastermind of the geno-
36 In early 2010, the Rwandan government published the Mutsinzi Report,
which sets forth the "standard" narrative, despite the ICTR Military-I Judg-
ment having found to the contrary. See generally, INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE
OF EXPERTS, REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO
THE CAUSES AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AT-
TACH OF 06/04/1994 (2007), available at http://mutsinzireport.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2010/01/Falcon-Report-english.pdf (providing a more detailed
discussion of the "standard narrative" and references).
37 See generally MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17. See infra notes 90-
117 and accompanying text. See also, HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 261-272.
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cide" former Colonel Theoneste Bagosora) were charged with
having long-planned genocidal crimes against civilians that were
carried out in 100-days of mass violence, after the plane carrying
the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down, probably
by them, on the evening of April 6, 1994.38
At the time, I knew very little about the UN Tribunal and
even less about Rwanda. Carla Del Ponte's announcement was
the first time that I heard that the victors in the Rwanda war
were even suspected of committing crimes. Like nearly everyone
else, I naively thought the victors in the Rwanda in 1994 were
the "good guys!" But, it was not terribly surprising when Paul
Kagame, the RPF General and President of Rwanda who Del
Ponte accused of war crimes, called for her resignation within a
matter of hours. 39 The predictable took on the air of mystery a
few days later when, during a TV press conference from Wash-
ington, D.C., U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell took a time-
out from discussing the so-far unsuccessful search for "weapons
of mass destruction" in Iraq, to echo Kagame's call for Del
Ponte's removal and4o deepened further when the U.N.'s Kofi
Annan soon followed suit.41
Why the U.S. Secretary of State and the U.N. Secretary Gen-
eral would favor removing the Chief Prosecutor from her posi-
tion for the "mistake" of announcing that she intended to do her
job? Powell and Annan had piqued my curiosity, so I agreed to
accept the assignment as Lead Counsel for Major Aloys
38 See MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17, at 223 (reproducing Del
Ponte's opening statement in the Military-I Trial, delivered on April 2, 2002).
39 My personal observations in Arusha were later confirmed by the interna-
tional media in the days and weeks that followed. See MADAME PROSECU-
TOR, supra note 17; HARTMANN, supra note 18. See also, infra notes 90-117
and accompanying text.
40 Id.
41 See Steven Edwards, Del Ponte Said UN Caved to Rwandan Pressure, NA-
TIONAL POST, Sept. 17, 2003; John Hooper, I Was Sacked as Rwanda Geno-
cide Prosecutor for Challenging the President Says Del Ponte, GUARDIAN,
Sept. 13, 2003; Felicity Barringer, Annan is Said to Want a New Prosecutor for
Rwanda War Crimes, N. Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003.
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Ntabakuze, one of four accused military-officer "architects of
the genocide" in the Military-I Trial in the summer of 2003. A
few weeks later, the Security Council announced that Carla Del
Ponte was being removed from her job,42 to be replaced by
Abubacar Jallow. Jallow soon announced that, unlike Del
Ponte, he would not be prosecuting Kagame or the RPF, a
pledge he has honored to this day, despite the growing public
exposure of RPF crimes that have long been known to ICTR
Prosecutors.43
Not until February 2009, when Ms. Del Ponte published the
English edition of her memoirs,44 did I and the rest of the En-
glish-speaking world, learn that the U.S. State Department War
Crimes Ambassador, Pierre Prosper, actually removed Del
Ponte from her job in 2003. Former Chief U.N. Prosecutor Del
Ponte's memoirs have made plain to the world that the U.S. de-
termines who the U.N. Security Council tribunals (both the
ICTR and the ICTY) will or will not prosecute, for policy rea-
sons unrelated to the facts known to the ICTR or ICTY Prose-
42 See, S.C. Res 203, U.N. Doc S/RES/203/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) (requesting
nomination by the Security Council for a new ICTR prosecutor and nominat-
ing Del Ponte for reappointment as ICTY prosecutor).
43 ICTR/Mandate - The ICTR's Mandate Covers the Habyarimana Assassi-
nation (Des Forges), HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.
hirondellenews.com/content/view/9316/99/.
Alison Des Forges, expert witness before the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and in charge of Africa
for the organization Human Rights Watch, affirmed Tuesday
before the ICTR that she could not understand why no investi-
gation had been opened into the downing of Juvenal Haby-
arimana's plane.
"I am of the same opinion of Judge Goldstone, the first prose-
cutor of the ICTR, that this is part of the tribunal's mandate,"
she said during her cross-examination in Tharcisse Renzaho's
trial. According to the prosecutor currently in place, Mr.
Abubacar Jallow, the investigation into the assassination which
sparked the genocide is not part of the ICTR's mandate."
44 See MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17.
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cutor.45 Those striving to establish a system of international
justice, based on due process and equality before the law, owe
her a debt of gratitude.
Apparent ICTR Impunity for Kagame and the RPF
Once I agreed to the ICTR appointment in the summer of
2003, everything about Rwanda, Central Africa and the ICTR
took on new importance. While the rest of the world was focus-
ing on Iraq, those of us at the ICTR were paying attention to the
first Rwandan "elections" since the war. Kagame controlled the
Rwandan military and had been made President in RPF Party
ballots with a 81-5 majority in 2000 to replace former President
Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, after Kagame accused Bizimungu of
crimes and forced him to step down, or suffer the consequences.
The Speaker of the Parliament, Joseph Sebarenzi, a Tutsi, was
driven into exile after being threatened by Kagame at about the
same time.46
Bizimungu was imprisoned when he contested the first popu-
lar election in 2003. Another possible candidate in 2003, the first
RPF Prime Minister Twagiramungu, who had been in exile for
several years and returned to Rwanda to contest the election,
was forced into exile when his political party was outlawed as
"divisionist." 4 7 The European Union Observer Mission reported
large-scale ballot fraud, vote buying and a "climate of intimida-
tion, as Kagame went on to win 95% of the "popular" vote.48
Even though the reports of election fraud were well-known,4 9 no
one at the ICTR seemed to notice that the Kagame regime was
45 See generally, Id. See also, HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 261-272.
46 See JOSEPH SEBARENZI, GOD SLEEPS IN RWANDA (2009).
47 COLIN WAUGH, supra note 34, at 185-206 (citing COLETTE FLESCH, RE-
PORT OF EUROPEAN OBSERVER MISSION (2003)).
48 Id. See generally, U.S. DEPARTMENT of STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS on
HUMAN RIGHTS Practices 2003: RWANDA (February 25, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27744.html.
49 See COLIN WAUGH, supra note 34; COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 48.
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becoming a dictatorship, although it was well-known even
among former Kagame/RPF supporters, such as Prof. Filip
Reyntjens, a former ICTR prosecution witness, who wrote in
2004:
Ten years after the 1994 genocide, Rwanda is ex-
periencing not democracy and reconciliation, but
dictatorship and exclusion. Although the govern-
ment led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front has
achieved rapid institutional reconstruction and rel-
atively good bureaucratic governance, it has also
concentrated power and wealth in the hands of a
very small [RPF] minority, practiced ethnic dis-
crimination, eliminated every form of dissent, de-
stroyed civil society, conducted a fundamentally
flawed 'democratization' process, and massively
violated human rights at home and abroad. The
Rwandan army twice invaded neighboring Zaire-
Congo, where its initial security concerns gave
way to a logic of plunder. It has caused protracted
regional instability and derailed the transition pro-
cess in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The Rwandan government has succeeded in
avoiding condemnation by astutely exploiting the
'genocide credit' and by skillful information man-
agement. The international community has been
complicit in the rebuilding of a dictatorship under
the guise of democracy. It assumes grave responsi-
bility in allowing structural violence to develop
once again, just as before 1994. In the years to
come, this may well lead to renewed acute
violence.50
The Security Council "Del Ponte-replacement," Abubacar Jal-
low, continued to call witnesses provided by the RPF to con-
50 Reyntjens, supra note 35.
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demn those the RPF defeated, as if Carla Del Ponte had never
had even mentioned that the ICTR prosecutor's office had suffi-
cient evidence to prosecute the RPF and Paul Kagame for inter-
national crimes committed in 1994.
U.N. Experts 2001, 2002, 2003 (2008 and August 2010):
Millions Die in Rwanda's Illegal Occupation and
Theft of Congo Resources
About the same time that Carla Del Ponte was appealing for
her job and Kagame was winning a sham election in 2003, the
U.N. Security Council was receiving the third in a series of re-
ports it had commissioned regarding the resource rape of the
Congo by Rwanda.51 These reports detailed the invasion of the
Congo by Rwandan and Ugandan troops in 1996 and 1998.52
The 2003 report followed similar reports in 2001 and 2002 which
described how Rwanda and Uganda had occupied huge areas of
the eastern Congo and directed Congo's wealth east to Kigali
and Kampala.53 Three million Congolese had died by 2003, and
many more have died since.5 4 Despite these reports, Mr. Jallow
51 U.N. Security Council Panel of Experts Report on the Illegal Exploitation
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1027 (Oct. 20,
2003) available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/.
52 Id. See also FILIP REYNTJENS, The Great African War: Congo and Re-
gional Geopolitics, 1996-2006 (2009).
53 See also 600 page UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Report
leaked to the press on August 27, 2010 documenting genocide committed by
the RPF against Hutu victims in the Congo between 1993-2003: Democratic
Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise Docu-
menting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Law
Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo be-
tween March 1993 and June 2003, Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, June 2010, Draft available at http://www.rwandadocuments
project.net/. See also DRC: Mapping Human Rights Violations 1993-2003,
Oct. 1, 2010, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AfricaRegion/Pages/RDC
ProjetMapping.aspx.
54 U.N. Security Council Panel of Experts Report on the Illegal Exploitation
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1027 (Oct. 20,
2003) available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/. The most recent estimates are
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kept introducing RPF-supplied evidence that painted the RPF
as the "good guys" in the Rwandan conflict, to condemn the
members of the government and military the RPF had defeated,
as if these reports of RPF occupation and crimes in the Congo
didn't exist. 55
Using ICTR Disclosure Principles to Prevent the Falsification
of History: The Suppressed U.N. "Rwanda Genocide
Papers" Unearthed by Ntabakuze Defense
Between the Fall of 2003 and the close of the Prosecution's
case at the end of 2005, Mr. Jallow's staff used very few, if any,
of the thousands of pages of contemporaneous documents pro-
duced by agencies and organizations that had staff in Rwanda
between 1993-95, the years in which the genocide conspiracy
was supposedly being planned and carried out, including: the
U.N. itself; the United States; United Kingdom; France;
Belgium; and a variety of Non-Governmental Organizations and
religious organizations.5 6 And, when it became apparent that
Mr. Jallow did not intend to use these documents to prove up his
that more than 6 million have been killed and more civilians are being killed
in the eastern Congo every 4 months than have been killed in Darfur in total.
See U.N. Security Council Panel of Experts Final Report on the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2008/773 (Dec. 12, 2008) available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/.
55 It may become more difficult to pretend that Rwanda's criminal exploita-
tion of the Congo is not taking place in light of the United Nations Security
Council Report of Experts of December 2008 and the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights Report leaked to the Le Monde and the New York
Times, on August 27, 2010, documenting genocide committed by the RPF
against Hutu victims in the Congo between 1993-2003.
56 See generally Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (2008) (Prosecution
Exhibits). Unclassified State Department documents between 1993 and
1995, also exhibits in Military-I and posted on the Rwanda Documents Pro-
ject website, include many references to other governments and NGO's that
were present in Rwanda during this entire period. See RoMeo DALLAIRE,
BRENT BEARDSLEY, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF Hu-
MANITY IN RWANDA 90 (2004) for references to governments reporting on
events in Rwanda.
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case, the Ntabakuze defense began asking for disclosure of these
documents under ICTR disclosure rules requiring the Prosecu-
tion to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence to the de-
fense.57 Since 2003, the Ntabakuze defense has managed to
secure copies of nearly all of the U.N.-Rwanda files that had
been generated at U.N. headquarters in New York by Kofi An-
nan's Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) be-
tween 1993-1995. It has also obtained copies of documents from
the U.N. mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) files in Kigali when
that office closed down.58
In early September 2010, the Ntabakuze team has also re-
quested the ICTR Appeal Chamber to order the Prosecutor to
disclose the files describing RPF crimes that Carla Del Ponte
describes in her memoirs.59 The ICTR Appeal Chamber will
have to decide whether, in light of what Del Ponte has revealed
about the criminal culpability of Paul Kagame and the victors in
the Rwanda war, it will permit itself to continue to be complicit
in the long-running cover-up of RPF crimes, committed before,
during and after the "Rwandan genocide" that has prevented
both the ICTR Defense and the ICTR Chambers from being
able to properly assess the liability of both sides in the Rwanda
War. Many of the documents from U.N. files that the Ntabakuze
Defense has been successful in securing are in the evidentiary
57 ICTR Rule 68 requires the prosecution to disclose potentially exculpatory
evidence to the defense. The Ntabakuze requested disclosure of suppressed
UN files, as well.
58 See generally Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibits).
59 See Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Motion for Disclosure Pur-
suant to Rule 68 (Sept. 6, 2010)). The request includes evidence of Kagame's
involvement in the assassination of President Habyarimana suppressed by
former Chief Prosecutor Arbour as described in the affidavit of Queen's
Prosecutor Michael Hourigan, copied later in this article, and the Prosecution
file secret file numbers of RPF crimes leaked to the press in May 2010, as
well as files referred to in Del Ponte's memoir.
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record of the Military-I trial,60 and others are catalogued on the
author's Rwanda Documents Project website.61
The Suppressed U.N. Document -based "Rwanda genocide"
Narrative: The Foundation for "Genocide
Denial" Allegations
From these documents and testimony from U.S. government
and U.N. witnesses at the ICTR, another narrative of the
"Rwanda genocide" is beginning to emerge. This version differs
significantly from the victor's description of the last 100-days of
the RPF more than 3-year war of invasion to seize power in
Rwanda. The February 9, 2009 Judgment in the Military-I case,
acquitting the top-four military officers of conspiracy or plan-
ning to commit genocide, was the first concrete manifestation
that this alternative narrative was better supported by the long-
suppressed U.N. documentary evidence than the narrative con-
cocted by the victors.62
60 See Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibits); Prosecu-
tor v. Ndindilyimana, ICTR Case No. 00-56-T (Oct. 6, 2006).
61 See The Rwanda Documents Project website, http://www.rwandadocu-
mentsproject.net, (under construction) by the author with the assistance of
William Mitchell College of Law. The purpose of The Rwanda Documents
Project is to put documents into the public record that make independent
research possible. The Ntabakuze Defense has also benefited from the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) by being able to access contemporaneous,
unclassified reports generated by the State Department, Pentagon, and CIA,
via the National Security Archive. These documents are also on the website.
As time goes on, original, contemporaneous documents from the U.N., U.S.,
France, Belgium, Canada, U.K. and Rwanda, and contemporaneous media
reports will be added to the database to provide an accurate evidentiary base
for researchers to better understand the complete Rwanda genocide narra-
tive, not only that told by the victors.
62 Another welcome confirmation is the report of the United Nations High
Commission on Human Rights leaked to Le Monde on August 27, 2010,
which confirms that massive crimes have been committed by the RPF in the
Congo, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. Many of these
crimes meet the definition of genocide. See Bombshell UN report leaked,
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After 7 years of examining the best evidence that the RPF
could muster, with the active assistance of the U.S. and U.N.,
the unanimous ICTR three-judge panel ruled that the victors'
version of the Rwanda genocide (i.e. that the "Rwandan geno-
cide" was a long-planned conspiracy to kill Tutsi civilians on the
part of the vanquished army) was not supported by the
evidence. 63
When viewed against the backdrop of targeted
killings and massive slaughter perpetrated by civil-
ian and assailants between April and July 1994 as
well as earlier cycles of violence, it is understanda-
ble why for many this evidence... shows a prior
conspiracy to commit genocide. .. .However, they
are also consistent with preparations for a political
or military power struggle... when confronted with
circumstantial evidence [the Chamber] can only
convict where it is the only reasonable infer-
ence... the Prosecution has not shown that the only
reasonable inference based on credible evi-
dence... was that [genocidal] intention was shared
by the Accused....the Chamber is not satisfied that
the Prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that the four Accused conspired among
themselves, or with others to commit genocide
before it unfolded on 7 April 1994.64 (emphasis
added).
In finding that the Prosecutor failed to prove that the top four
military officers "conspired among themselves or with others to
commit genocide," the ICTR judges rejected the RPF victors'
claims that the vanquished forces had long planned to kill hun-
supra note 7. See also Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights, supra note 53.
63 See generally Military-I, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Final Judgment).
64 See id at 539-40, [ 2110-2113.
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dreds of thousands of civilians for ethnic reasons and that they
had assassinated their own President and military leaders.65
Ironically, the English language edition of Ms. Del Ponte's
memoir was published nearly simultaneously with the written
Military-I Judgment in February 2009. The Military-I Judgment
completely rejects the major premise of her 2002 prosecution of
the Military-I defendants, described in the memoir. But, her
memoir does reveal that, during the summer of 2003 at about
the same time that I had heard her announce that she possessed
evidence to prosecute the RPF, she had been fired by the U.S.
State Department for attempting to prosecute the RPF.66 The
memoir also describes in more detail the crimes for which the
ICTR Prosecutor Del Ponte had evidence to hold Kagame and
the RPF criminally culpable, as of 2003.
The February 2009 confirmation of the existence of this evi-
dence by Del Ponte merely added to the evidence presented in
the Ntabakuze Defense Trial Brief filed in May 200767 that actu-
ally went farther than Del Ponte's memoir in explaining how the
documentary evidence from the U.N. and U.S. government files
(as well as the direct testimony of both Prosecution and Defense
witnesses) provided a coherent explanation of how the commu-
nal violence erupted in Rwanda after the assassination of two
Presidents on April 6, 1994, that did not include a long-planned
conspiracy to kill civilians by the vanquished army.68 Del Ponte's
memoir also confirmed that ICTR investigators had known
since 1997 that the assassinations of the two Presidents was not a
mystery at all, but was a war crime committed by Kagame's
RPF69 as part of their final military assault to seize power.
65 See generally Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Final Judgment).
66 MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17.
67 See generally Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Brief).
68 See id.
69 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT-365); Mil-
itary-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony of Lt. Abdul Ruzibiza); Mil-
itary-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony of BRA).
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The May 2007 Ntabakuze Trial Brief in the Military-I case
summarizes, for the first time, the compilation of original U.N.
documents which, like the Pentagon Papers70 or Wikileaks files, 71
expose a previously suppressed history of war. Not unlike the
observation of Robert McNamara from the Fog of War quoted
at the beginning of the article,72 it is becoming increasingly clear
that the victors in the Rwanda war, Paul Kagame and the RPF,
have been able to avoid their own responsibility for the mass
violence of the victors which they have characterized as the
"Rwandan genocide," for which they have asserted the van-
quished are exclusively responsible.73 Having discovered and
publicized the "Rwanda Genocide Papers," that are already in
the ICTR public record and posted on the Rwanda Documents
Project website, as well as other evidence of crimes of Kagame's
RPF are mounting by the day, are the reason I was arrested by
the Rwandan government and labeled a "genocide denier" not
opinion pieces posted on the internet, as the Rwandan govern-
ment has publicly claimed.74
The following sections of the article summarize the contents
of some of the "Rwandan Genocide Papers" to explain hap-
70 See MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17; New York Times Co. v. United
States; United States v. Washington Post, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
71 See MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17; Iraq war logs: media reaction
around the world, UK GUARDIAN, Oct. 28, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2010/oct/28/iraq-war-logs-media-reaction.
72 THE FOG OF WAR, supra note 2.
73 See discussion of Del Ponte memoirs, Hartmann memoirs and evidence of
unprosecuted RPF crimes, infra and supra.
74 See Military-I, ICTR Case No. 98-41-A (Registrar Submission Pursuant to
Rule 33). Unfortunately, I received chilling confirmation of this assessment
from current and former members of the Kagame RPF government, who re-
ported the subject of a meeting in Kigali in mid-October 2010 during which
President Kagame informed military and government leaders that my release
from Rwanda in June was a "mistake," and that I should be returned to
Rwanda "dead or alive." (Confidential email on file with the author). The
sources are credible enough that I cannot ignore the threat and have filed
reports with local and federal law enforcement and the U.S. State
Department.
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pened in Rwanda in 1994, according to contemporaneous U.N.
and U.S. government documents, and sworn testimony in the
Military-I Trial evidence.
II. SECURITY COUNCIL MANIPULATION OF U.N. TRIBUNALS:
AN UNAVOIDABLE CLASH OF LAW AND POLITICS?
It is unfair that politics undermines our work [at
the ICTR]. I find it wounding to see that we have
managed to ridicule the principles of international
justice... because Kagame has signed a bi-lateral
agreement [with the United States]. . .75
Chief U.N. Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte
Much scholarship and main-stream reportage of Security
Council ad hoc tribunal proceedings has taken place in a kind of
intellectual vacuum that is so divorced from the political reality
that, with precious few exceptions, 76 the analysis appears to be
the product of almost willful denial:
The question of politicization is not a straightfor-
ward one. The decision to establish the tribunal
was political, and it was established for a political
purpose, but its internal mandate is to the delivery
of justice. Thus, while politics permeated every as-
75 Ms. Hartmann reports the 2003 exchange between Ms. Del Ponte and
Iqbal Riza, the first assistant to Kofi Annan in 1994 in the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations: "It is unfair that politics undermines our work. I
find it wounding to see that we have managed to ridicule the principles of
international justice ... because Kagame has signed a bi-lateral agreement
[with the United States]." HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 271-72.
76 See generally DR. HANS KOECHLER, GLOBAL JUSTICE OR GLOBAL RE-
VENGE? INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS (2003);
DR. HANS KOECHLER, WORLD ORDER: VISION AND REALITY (2009); JOHN
LAUGHLAND, Why this court is a criminal waste of time and money, DAILY
MAIL UK, July 26, 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/; JOHN LAUGHLAND ,
The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction, http://www.iccwatch.org/articleMar09.
html; KINGSLEY MOGHALU, RWANDA'S GENOCIDE: THE POLITICS OF
GLOBAL JUSTICE 5 (2005).
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pect of the tribunal's operation, including its es-
tablishment, proceedings had to be conducted in a
political vacuum. On a conceptual level, while this
form of justice is inherently political, the judicial
process is not necessarily "politicized." On a prac-
tical level, the interaction of politics and law was
central to the tribunal's ability to perform its judi-
cial function, it did so independently of politics,
which was crucial for its success as a tool for the
restoration of peace and security. [emphasis
supplied.77]
With precious few exceptions, writers with impeccable U.N. tri-
bunal credentials have noted that, because the Security Council
is essentially a political body at the apex of an inherently politi-
cal United Nations, it should be no surprise that "politics" and
the interests of more-powerful nations would suffuse the func-
tioning of any judicial body established by the Security Council.
Kingsley Moghalu, former spokesperson for the ICTR;78 Kofi
Annan's Chief Aide Iqbal Riza;79 U.N. Office of Legal Affairs
Chief Counsel Ralph Zacklin;80 and U.S. War Crimes Ambassa-
dor Pierre Prosper81 have all made this simple observation.
77 See RACHEL KERR, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: AN EXERCISE IN LAW, POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY 2
(2004), for an example of the sort of wishful thinking that Ms. Del Ponte has
put to rest.
78 See MOGHALU, supra note 76, at 5.
79 On the occasion of Del Ponte being removed from her ICTR post in 2003,
Hartmann's account quotes Secretary General Annan's chief aide, Iqbal Riza
as saying, "It's all politics. It should not have happened like this, but every-
thing is politicized." HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 271-72.
80 Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. OF
INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 541 (2004) (former Chief of UN Office of Legal Affairs.)
81 Prosper has noted that "war crimes 'justice' is political." See MOGHALU,
supra note 76, at 5.
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But not all ICTR participants are willing to be as straightfor-
ward. For example, former ICTR President Navanthem Pillay of
South Africa 82 is capable of asserting, without apparent irony:
Yes, justice can be selective, it can be political. But
if you ask me if justice is being done here (at the
ICTR), I can say, YES!83
Of course, any concept of "justice" worthy of the name can be
neither selective nor political, but Judge Pillay's refreshingly
straightforward statement demonstrates the distortion of funda-
mental concepts of equality before the law and the conflation of
legal decision-making with political expediency - a conflation
that has been accepted as "normal" by the current incarnation
of international tribunals. 84 The description of Del Ponte's ap-
pointment by the Security Council, and the political reality lim-
iting her ability to perform normal prosecutorial duties and
decision-making, in the Del Ponte and Hartmann's memoirs
provide concrete examples of how the policy interests of the
U.S. distorts the actual functioning of international tribunals as
institutions of international justice.85
82 Judge Navanethem Pillay was President of the ICTR during the period
Del Ponte was investigating the RPF and when she was removed from office
in 2003, which makes it difficult to believe that Pillay was not aware of the
"cover-up" of RPF crimes at that time. Five years later, the appointment of
Navanethem Pillay as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was ap-
proved by the General Assembly on July 28, 2008. She took up the post on
September 1, 2008. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/HighCommis-
sioner.aspx. Members of her UNHCHR staff leaked the report documenting
RPF crimes in Congo to Le Monde in late August 2010.
83 See Bob Braun, Rwandans Face a Reckoning in UN Trials, NEWHOUSE
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 17, 2002.
84 See generally MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17.
85 Id.
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a. How the Ad Hoc Security Council Tribunals Actually
Work: Lessons from Del Ponte's Appointment as
Chief U.N. Prosecutor
In mid-1999, just as the NATO-bombing of Serbia was coming
to an end, the Swiss Secretary of State submitted Del Ponte's
name as a candidate to replace the Security Council's top prose-
cutor for Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals, Louise Arbour,
who had been nominated to Canada's Supreme Court.86 Del
Ponte's nomination was approved primarily because Switzerland
is not a member of the U.N., EU or NATO.87 Security Council
Permanent Members China and Russia objected that any candi-
date from a NATO country was unsuitable because NATO
bombers had recently destroyed the Chinese embassy and dev-
astated the civilian infrastructure of Russia's Yugoslav ally.88
Similarly, the two NATO allies on the Security Council, the
U.S. and U.K., would not accept a prosecutor from Russia,
China, or non-allied countries that might be sympathetic to
claims that the NATO-bombing of Yugoslavian cities and infra-
structure constituted a war crime.89 An experienced prosecutor
from a neutral country, not implicated in the NATO bombing
and not a member of the EU or the U.N., Del Ponte was the
perfect compromise candidate. 90 Del Ponte's first person ac-
86 After serving on the Canadian Supreme Court, Ms. Arbour was appointed
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, preceding the appointment of
Navanethem Pillay. Since 2009, Ms. Arbour has been President of the Inter-
national Crisis Group, a NATO-oriented international foreign policy non-
governmental organization founded by former U.S. State Department per-
sonnel in 1995, headquartered in Brussels. See International Crisis Group,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/.
87 See MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17, at 11-32 for a discussion of Del
Ponte's appointment.
88 See id.
89 Id.
90 Id. Del Ponte was only the third prosecutor to be appointed to the Secur-
ity Counsel post when she replaced Canadian Louise Arbour, who had re-
placed the first ICTY-ICTR Prosecutor, South Africa's Sir Richard
Goldstone, in 1996. Del Ponte succeeded Arbour in August 1999 and moved
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count describes that, from the outset of her relationship with the
tribunals, Security Council politics made her appointment possi-
ble and necessary.
b. Del Ponte at the ICTR: Lessons in the Realpolitik of the
Ad Hoc Security Council Tribunals
As early as November 1999, only a month after taking office,
Del Ponte learned that her long-time colleague, French examin-
ing magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere, 91 had opened an investiga-
tion into the assassination of Presidents Habyarimana of
Rwanda and Ntaryamira of Burundi, both of whom had died in
a missile attack on Habyarimana's plane on the night of April 6,
1994. This dual assassination set off the 100-days of massive vio-
lence known as the "Rwandan genocide" between April 6 and
mid-July 1994.92 The French judge had come to the conclusion
that the RPF and Paul Kagame were probably responsible for
the assassination. 93 Del Ponte's Chief Investigator Laurent
Walpen developed evidence not only of the assassination of the
two presidents, but also of other RPF crimes 94 with "[e]stimates
to the Prosecutor's Hague offices in September. From the outset, the politics
of the Security Council made her appointment possible and, as she was to
learn, imposed a muro di gomma (wall of rubber) on fulfilling her
prosecutorial obligations far beyond any she could have imagined from her
prosecutions of international gangsters, financiers, and politicians in
Switzerland.
91 Judge Brugui~re had become well-known for prosecuting major interna-
tional criminals in France as Del Ponte had in Switzerland during the same
period. Del Ponte knew Brugui~re and trusted his judgment and his work on
cases like Carlos the Jackal, and others. See MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra
note 17, at 179-81. Spanish Judge Merelles Abreu came to the same conclu-
sion in an indictment issued in 2008. See infra notes 233 et seq. and accompa-
nying text.
92 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (April 6, 1994) (Defence Exhibit
DNT 120).
93 Id.
94 The Arusha prosecution had catalogued fourteen sites of massacres and
was making efforts to go up the chain of command." HARTMANN, supra note
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of the dead.. .in the tens of thousands." 95 But Del Ponte's mem-
oir explains that the investigations were blocked by the
Rwandan government:
.. because President Kagame and the other Tutsi
leaders had staked so much of their claim to politi-
cal legitimacy upon the RPF's victory over the ge-
nocidaires in 1994. And they were marketing their
takeover of the country as a righteous struggle to
halt the genocide. 96
Moreover, U.S. intelligence agencies were assisting the
Rwandans in compromising the security of the ICTR Prosecu-
tor's Office:
We knew the Rwandan Intelligence service had
received monitoring devices from the United
States and was using them to compromise our
telephone, fax and Internet traffic.97
By May 2002, Bruguiere recommended to Kofi Annan that the
ICTR prosecute Kagame because France lacked jurisdiction
over sitting heads of state.98 In early June 2002, Kagame and the
RPF were ". . .blackmailing the tribunal•.. in order to halt the
Office of the Prosecutor's Special Investigation of crimes alleg-
edly committed by. . .the RPF in 1994." 99 According to Del
Ponte:
18, at 66. Del Ponte confirms Laurent Walpen on her staff developed evi-
dence of these sites. See MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17, at 184.
95 See infra note 245 and accompanying text. This same evidence was appar-
ently provided in January 1997 to Ms. Del Ponte's predecessor, Louise Ar-
bour, who suppressed the evidence, stopped the investigation and disbanded
the investigative team that made the recommendation that Kagame be prose-
cuted for the assassination of Habyarimana, as described herein. Ms. Del
Ponte does not reveal whether she was aware of Ms. Arbour's suppression of
the earlier investigation of Kagame.
96 See MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17, at 183.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 235.
99 Id.
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... halting the genocide trials was the Rwandan
government's objective, so long as there was a
possibility that the tribunal would indict Tutsi
leaders and army officers. The motive, it seemed,
was preserving the Tutsi regime's legitimacy and,
by extension the rule of President Paul Kagame. 100
On July 23, 2002, Del Ponte publicly reported to the Security
Council:
the Prosecutor is effectively unable. . .to achieve
the investigation of crimes alleged to have been
committed by the Rwandan Patriotic [Front] in
1994.101
By November 2002, Del Ponte publicly exposed the refusal of
the Kagame government to cooperate with her investigations.102
On March 3, 2003, the U.S. State Department announced a new
area of cooperation between the U.S. and Rwanda in the form
of a signed bilateral agreement, initiated by the Bush adminis-
tration, to exempt each country's citizens from prosecution
before the International Criminal Court. Del Ponte wrote:
I suspected that, in return for Rwanda's signature
on the agreement, President Kagame had sought
United States support in the campaign to prevent
the Rwanda tribunal from completing its Special
Investigation and bringing indictments against se-
100 Id. Kagame was effectively elected President for Life in the Fall of 2003,
in an election that, as reported by European Union election observers, in-
cluded the jailing of all political opponents, not unlike the election of Robert
Mugabe in Zimbabwe five years later. See COLIN, supra note 34 at 197-203;
Rptr. Colette Flesch, Report of European Observer Mission, Sept. 2003, cited
in COLIN WAUGH, supra note 34, at 185-206; see also "Rwanda's Application
for Membership of the Commonwealth: Report and Recommendations of
the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative," Commonwealth Human
Rights Initiative, 2009, http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/
hradvocacy/rwanda%27s-application for membership-of the common-
wealth.pdf.
101 See MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17, at 227.
102 See MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17, at 223-41.
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nior Rwandan military officers, and perhaps
Kagame himself, in connection with massacres the
Tutsis had allegedly committed in 1994.103
Although Del Ponte only mentions the quid pro quo between
the U.S. and Rwanda in May 2003, a "special relationship" had
existed between the U.S. and the Kagame government for more
than a decade. 10 4
Florence Hartmann observed that U.S. interest in the
Brugui~re investigation and Del Ponte's investigation of
Kagame, as early as 2001 made it clear that "the Americans
wished to subject the court to an entirely political management
of its exit strategy."'1 5 And U.S. State Department memos dis-
covered by the Ntabakuze Defense Team, including one to U.S.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher from September 1994,
make clear that a cover-up of RPF crimes actually began as
early as August 1994,106 even before the Security Council voted
the Tribunal into existence in November.10 7
On May 15, 2003, Pierre Prosper, the Bush administration
Ambassador for War Crimes, called Del Ponte to the State De-
partment in Washington, D.C.108 Prosper asked her to turn over
103 See MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17, at 231.
104 The U.S. and U.K. support for Kagame and the RPF forces is further
documented in the 2009 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative Report
which urges rejection of application of Rwanda for admission to the Com-
monwealth. See generally COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE,
RWANDA'S APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMONWEALTH: RE-
PORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS
INITIATIVE 33 (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publi-
cations/hradvocacy/rwanda%27sapplication for membership-of thecom-
monwealth.pdf.
105 See HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 262-63.
106 Id.
107 See United Nations Security County Resolution establishing an Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc S/Res/955
(Nov. 8, 1994), supra note 11.
108 Prosper was no stranger to the ICTR Office of the Prosecutor; he had
been assigned by the Justice Department as lead prosecutor in the Akeyesu
case, which concluded just before Del Ponte's term began. See Prosecutor v.
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her investigative files to the Rwandan government.10 9 Del Ponte
refused. 110 Prosper informed her that she would not be re-ap-
pointed to the Rwanda tribunal."' On May 20, 2003 Del Ponte
received a State Department fax stating that the Office of the
Prosecutor should provide the Rwandan government with their
investigative files and agree not to prosecute RPF crimes.112 By
the end of July, the New York Times cited unnamed Western
diplomats as saying that the Rwandan government had won sup-
port from the United States and the United Kingdom for re-
moving Del Ponte.113 The Times also reported that British
diplomats said that the change in Prosecutors would include
dropping of investigations of the RPF.114
Del Ponte was removed from office on August 28, 2003, when
the Security Council passed Resolution 1503.115 She was re-
placed by Hassan Abubacar Jallow who continues to maintain
that the assassination of the two presidents remains outside
ICTR jurisdiction, 116 a position with which the first ICTR Prose-
cutor, former South African Supreme Court Justice Richard
Goldstone has publicly disagreed. 117 Since Jallow replaced Del
Akeyesu, ICTR Case No. 94-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998). This was the first case at the
ICTR to go to trial, and it resulted in history's first conviction for "genocide."
Prosper must also have long been aware of the RPF crimes that were being
investigated within the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTR. See discussion
of the Arbour and Bruguirre incidents infra and supra.
109 See MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17, at 231-32.
110 Id.
'I' Id.
112 This account is essentially the same as that reported by Hartmann. See
HARTMANN supra note 18, at 267-70.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 See HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 267-72; see also MADAME PROSECU-
TOR, supra note 17 at 227.
117 Richard Goldstone's remarks were reported by the Danish newspaper
BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. See ICTR/Attack-April 6th 1994 Attack Fits the
ICTR's Mandate (Goldstone), HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 13, 2006),
http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/4100/26/.
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Ponte, despite the evidence of RPF crimes that Del Ponte has
admitted none of the members of the victorious RPF army or
the Kagame government have been indicted at the ICTR to
date."l8 As is now apparent from Del Ponte and Hartmann's
memoirs and the acquittals in the Military-I case, the "victors'
narrative" of the Rwanda War and the "Rwanda genocide" is at
best incomplete.
III. WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN RWANDA: THE MILITARY-
I TRIAL EVIDENCE
A detailed description of the "victor's narrative" of the war
and the genocide is beyond the scope of this article. However,
other authors have treated this question in decontextualized de-
tail.119 The essence of the narrative is that Hutu "hardliners"
seized power in a coup after the Rwandan President's plane was
shot down on April 6, 1994 and carried out massive pre-planned
and long organized massacres of "Tutsi and moderate Hutus"
during a 100-day "genocide" until the long-planned killings were
stopped by the military victory of the RPF in mid-July 1994.120
The narrative ignores the four years of war that preceded the
118 Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to
Hassan Jallow, ICTR Chief Prosecutor (Aug. 14, 2009), available at: http://
www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/08/14/letter-ictr-chief-prosecutor-hassan-j allow-
response-his-letter-prosecution-rpf-crime.
We also urge you to prosecute other senior RPF commanders
who led similar military operations in other parts of the country
in 1994 and against whom the ICTR has evidence. The recent
extension of the Tribunal's mandate until the end of 2010 af-
fords an opportunity for such prosecutions to take place. Fail-
ure to do so will taint perceptions of the Tribunal's impartiality
and undermine its legitimacy for years to come.
119 For a much more detailed description of the dominant narrative, see Bar-
rie Munro Collins, The Rwanda War 1990-1994: Interrogating the Dominant
Narrative (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London) (also available at http://www.rwandadocu-
mentsproject.net).
120 Id.
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100-days of extreme violence, the conditions in Rwanda caused
by the war, and the most important event preceding the mass
violence in Rwanda, the explosive mass violence in Rwanda's
"sister-country," neighboring Burundi, following the assassina-
tion of the Burundian President only six months before the
"Rwandan genocide." Taken out of historical and political con-
text, the victors' narrative is compelling. The Military-I Trial evi-
dence told a completely different story from many of the same
facts, arising from the historical context provided by third par-
ties and mainly from suppressed 1993-95 UN files.
a. The Failure of the ICTR Prosecutor's "Genocide
Conspiracy" Narrative as Demonstrated by the
Military-I Judgment, February 9, 2009
Del Ponte's April 2002 opening statement in the Military-I
case summarizes the central theme of the dominant narrative,
which relies on the assertion of a long-planned "genocide con-
spiracy" at the highest levels of the former government and mili-
tary, to explain the extreme violence that engulfed Rwanda
between April and July 1994. The opening statement is repro-
duced in Carla Del Ponte's memoir:
"These four men [Col. Theoneste Bagosora, Col.
Anatole Nsengiyumva, Gen. Gratien Kabiligi, and
Maj. Aloys Ntabakuze] are among the perpetra-
tors of the genocide... Who is responsible for close
to a million deaths in a few months? Who is re-
sponsible for all the other victims mutilated, tor-
tured, raped, left for dead." The indictment
alleged that Bagosora and other commanders on
trial were part of a group of senior Hutu officers
who had, for several years, planned the systematic
extermination of the Tutsi's and moderate Hutus in
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order to secure the Hutu Extremist's political domi-
nance of the country...121
There is no doubt that widespread extreme communal violence
swept Rwanda for 100-days beginning on April 6, 1994 when the
plane of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was shot
down. But the dominant narrative and Del Ponte's opening
statement both fail to mention the context of the Rwandan vio-
lence, which was evidence in the Military-I trial and discussed in
detail later in this article. In April 1994: (a) Rwanda had been
embroiled in war for more than four years between the major-
ity-Hutu government and an invading Ugandan-RPF army com-
prised of minority Tutsi members of the former Rwandan ruling
aristocracy; (b) approximately one-sixth of its population had
been internally displaced by the war by mid-1993; (c) mass vio-
lence killing hundreds of thousands of majority Hutu peasants
had also swept neighboring Burundi six-months before April
1994, after Burundi's first elected President was assassinated by
the Burundian Tutsi ruling class army; (d) more than a quarter-
million Burundian refugees flooded Rwanda before April 1994;
and, (e) the vast majority of Rwandans were terrified that noth-
ing could protect them from being brutally subjugated by the
former ruling class, whose army could not be stopped.
Ironically, the English edition of Del Ponte's memoir was
published almost simultaneously with the Military Judgment 122
of February 2009, in which the Court ruled on whether the
ICTR Prosecutor could actually prove the long-planned "con-
spiracy to commit genocide" of which she accused my client and
three other defendants. 123 After seven-years of receiving evi-
dence of the "long-planned conspiracy to commit genocide" de-
scribed in Ms. Del Ponte's opening statement, the three-judge
ICTR panel unanimously held:
121 See MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17, at 223.
122 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T 2009 (Judgment).
123 Id. at 539-40.
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When viewed against the backdrop of targeted
killings and massive slaughter perpetrated by civil-
ian and assailants between April and July 1994 as
well as earlier cycles of violence, it is understanda-
ble why for many this evidence. . .shows a prior
conspiracy to commit genocide. . .However, they
are also consistent with preparations for a political
or military power struggle ... when confronted with
circumstantial evidence [the Chamber] can only
convict where it is the only reasonable infer-
ence... the Prosecution has not shown that the only
reasonable inference based on credible evi-
dence ... was that [genocidal] intention was shared
by the Accused.
S.. the Chamber is not satisfied that the Prosecu-
tion has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
four Accused conspired among themselves, or with
others to commit genocide before it unfolded on 7
April 1994.124 (emphasis added)
The ICTR judges' conclusion that the assassination of the two
Presidents was the impetus behind the extreme communal vio-
lence that broke out in Rwanda is not a conclusion held solely
by the ICTR judges. Nor is it a new conclusion. Just minutes
after the plane was shot down on the night of April 6, 1994 the
Africa desk at the State Department sent a cable to the U.S.
Embassy in Kigali that said:
If, as it appears, both Presidents have been killed,
there is a strong likelihood that widespread vio-
lence could break out in either or both countries
(i.e Rwanda and Burundi), particularly if it is con-
124 Id.
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firmed that the plane was shot down. (emphasis
added).
Prudence Bushnell, Washington, D.C. to
David Rawson, U.S. Embassy in Kigali Rwanda,
April 7, 1994125
This is but one of thousands of pages of contemporaneous U.N.
documents that had been withheld from the defense at the
ICTR for nearly 14 years that the Ntabakuze defense success-
fully put into ICTR evidence.
Even Ms. Del Ponte's memoir makes clear that in May 2002,
when she argued that the Military-I defendants were engaged in
"a long-planned conspiracy," she had known for at least 3-years
that French Judge Bruguiere had evidence that Paul Kagame,
not the defendants on trial, had assassinated the two Presi-
dents.126 And that less than a month after she delivered this
opening statement, she knew that Judge Bruguiere recom-
mended to Kofi Annan that the U.N. prosecute Kagame for the
assassination of Habyarimana and other crimes. 127
And, with respect to the Military-I defendants "establishing
dominance over the country" after the assassination of the Presi-
dent, U.N. documents put into evidence by the Ntabakuze De-
fense, made clear that there was no takeover of the country by
the military after Habyarimana's assassination. For example,
UNAMIR General Romeo Dallaire wrote in an April 13, 1994
cable to U.N. Headquarters that the military could have staged
a coup after the assassination of the President, but didn't do
so. 128 And, the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs went even farther in
a May 25, 1994 Legal Opinion which acknowledged that the
post-Habyarimana civilian government, established on April 8,
1994, was the lawful successor government properly constituted
125 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT 120).
126 MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17, at 191.
127 Id.
128 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT 108).
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under the 1992 Rwandan Constitution, rather than the product
of a "coup"_129
This means that the U.N. files, which were available to Ms.
Del Ponte well before she made her opening statement in the
spring of 2002, showed that allegations against the Military-I de-
fendants, that they were:
•.. part of a group of senior Hutu officers who had,
for several years, planned the systematic extermi-
nation of the Tutsi's and moderate Hutus in order
to secure the Hutu Extremist's political dominance
of the country,.. .130
were not supported by the evidence in her own files. And, after
hearing seven-years of evidence, the three-judge Military-I
panel agreed and found that the Military-I defendants were not
engaged in a conspiracy to kill civilians, or to seize "political
dominance of the country" in the full Military-I Judgment in
February 2009.
b. De-Constructing the Victors' "Long-Planned Genocide"
Myth: Modern Origins of Mass Violence in the
1990-94 Rwandan War
The conflict between "Tutsi" (herding, pastoralist, aristocracy/
warrior caste) and "Hutu" (farmer, majority-peasant/client
caste) has deep roots in the African Great Lakes region, not just
Rwanda.131 Although the 100-days of communal violence were
sparked by the 1994 assassinations of the two presidents, the
tension between the two groups had been building in Rwanda
129 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT 193).
130 MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17, at 223.
131 See Filip Reyntjens, Constitution-making in situations of extreme crisis:
the case of Rwanda and Burundi, 40 JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW 236-39
(1996); see also Ren6 Lemarchand Managing Transition Anarchies, Rwanda,
Burundi and South Africa, 32 JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES, No.
4, (1994) (reporting on the impact of repeated Burundian massacres on polit-
ical conditions of Rwanda).
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since long before. Similar conflicts can be found throughout sub-
Saharan Africa where competing, but interconnected, systems
must co-exist with limited land and resources. 32 A discussion of
the specific history of this conflict in Rwanda is beyond the
scope of this article but it is possible to differentiate these dis-
tinctions as neither tribal nor cultural because Rwandan pasto-
ralists and farmers share the same language, religion and
traditions, but the historic caste-like divisions are real.133
Perhaps it is enough for purposes of this discussion to liken
Hutu/Tutsi distinctions to caste, or even feudal class differences
arising from differing relationships with land use. But, because
Hutu/Tutsi identity passes patrilinearly, a very "tutsi-appearing"
individual may actually self-identify as a Hutu, and a very "hutu-
appearing" individual as a Tutsi, and would be so-considered by
Rwandan society, depending on the identification of one's fa-
ther. In a stable village society, it would be easy enough to sort
out by common, collective knowledge one's parental lineage.
However, the question becomes more complicated when indi-
viduals find themselves in areas where parentage and family
lineage is not known, such as during the chaos of war, for exam-
ple, when "caste" and identification with an invading army be-
come conflated.134
The Origins of Rwandan Mass Violence in April 1994: The
October 1990 RFP Invasion from Uganda
With respect to the 1994 "Rwandan genocide" there is little
dispute that the most immediate source of the communal vio-
lence known as "the Rwandan genocide" began on October 1,
1990, when an estimated 3,000-4,000 troops of the National Re-
132 Id. Reyntjens supra note 131.
133 See Reyntjens and Lemarchand, supra note 131; see also discussion of
fears of re-establishment of a Tutsi aristocracy by U.S. Ambassador Robert
Flaten in 1992 report to State Department at note 146, infra.
134 See generally MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS
(2001); see also WAUGH, supra note 34.
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sistance Army (NRA) of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni
(later called the Rwandan Patriot Army or Rwandan Patriotic
Front-hereinafter RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda.135 These
Ugandan army troops were largely composed of the offspring of
members of the former Rwandan Tutsi-aristocracy and monar-
chy. 136 In the early 1960's, just prior to Rwandan independence
from Belgium, the Hutu-peasantry that made up some 85% of
the Rwandan population had deposed the Tutsi-aristocracy and
monarchy in favor of a majority-Hutu republic. 137
These Ugandan army troops were largely the offspring of
members of the former Rwandan Tutsi-aristocracy and monar-
chy,138 which had been deposed by a rebellion of the Hutu-peas-
antry that made up some 85% of the Rwandan population in
favor of a republic, just prior to Rwandan independence from
Belgium in the early 1960's. 139 The former Rwandan Tutsi aris-
tocracy faced discrimination as foreigners in Uganda, and many
of the children of the displaced Rwandan-Tutsi aristocracy (in-
cluding a teenage Paul Kagame) threw their lot in with the Na-
tional Resistance Army (NRA) of Yoweri Museveni, who led
armed rebellion against the elected government of President
Milton Obote that took some 500,000 Ugandan lives between
1981 and 1986.140
Museveni promised them full acceptance in Ugandan society
but, after seizing power, Museveni was pressured by indigenous
Ugandans to eliminate the influence of the large number of
Rwandan "foreigners" in the NRA ranks. In 1988 he withdrew
his support for the Rwandans remaining in and agreed to sup-
135 Id. Mamdani, supra note 134. The original number of troops is estimated
to be about 2,000 with 800 civilian supporters. See also STEPHEN KINZER, A
THOUSAND HILLS: RWANDA'S REBIRTH AND THE MAN WHO DREAMED IT
65 (2008).
136 See WAUGH, supra note 34.
137 Id; see also Mamdani, supra note 134.
138 See WAUGH, supra note 34.
139 Id.
140 See Mamdami, supra note 134.
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port their return to Rwanda by force of arms.141 On October 1,
1990 an estimated 3-4,000 mainly Rwandan troops of the
Ugandan NRA,) invaded Rwanda across the northern border
with Uganda.142
Paul Kagame, previously Museveni's senior intelligence of-
ficer, returned from training with the U.S. Army at Ft. Leaven-
worth, Kansas in late 1990 to lead the invasion. 143 Although the
Rwandan army (Forces Armee Rwandais- hereinafter, FAR) had
not been engaged in combat for several decades, the 5,000 FAR
conventional troops soundly defeated the invading RPF,144
which withdrew to the rugged Virunga mountains, where famed
primate researcher Dian Fossey had been murdered by "un-
known parties" in 1985, during the violence of the NRA war for
power in Uganda, and the film Gorillas in the Mist was set.145
RPF Military Superiority Established-
January 1991-February 1993
Between early 1991 and February 1993, Kagame led the RPF
in carrying out guerilla/terrorist raids from the Virunga Moun-
tains, despite an August 1992 ceasefire and ongoing peace nego-
tiations. According to the U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda Robert
Flaten the building military threat of the RPF promised an ex-
plosion of reactive violence because of deep-seated fear that the
Tutsi-aristocracy would reclaim power, should full-scale war re-
sume with an RPF offensive:
.. leaders from all sides have begun to realize the
more terrifying implications of an RPF march to
Kigali. No matter how many Hutus the RPF may
141 See Kinzer, supra note 135; see also Waugh, supra note 34.
142 Id. Kinzer, supra note 135; See also Mamdami, supra note 133.
143 See Kinzer, supra note 135; See also Waugh, supra note 34.
144 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (2004) (Defence Exhibit DB 71.)
See also, Kinzer, supra note 135 regarding defeat of the RPF.
145 AMADOU DEME, RWANDA 1994 AND THE FAILURE OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS MISSIONS: THE WHOLE TRUTH 16-17 (2010).
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have representing it, it is perceived in Rwanda as
an essentially Tutsi organization. Should this
group break through to Kigali, all the fears of the
Hutu majority of again being subjected to slavery
or feudal vassalage will be resurfaced. When
threatened with the restoration of the feudal sys-
tem, the Hutus on the collines (hills) will begin to
eliminate their Tutsi neighbors. When this hap-
pened in 1990. .... Habyarimana sent an army unit
in to stop it. When it happened in Bugasera in
March 1992, the Gendarmes eventually arrived to
encourage the restoration of calm. This was done
with an administration and communications in
place, neither of which would be the case should
Kigali fall to the RPF.146
In February 1993, the RPF broke the ceasefire with an assault
on Kigali, Rwanda's capital. The assault nearly succeeded and
gave substance to the fear of the restoration of aristocratic Tutsi
domination described by Ambassador Flaten.
Even though the RPF then withdrew to an area near the
Ugandan border so as to avoid combat with Belgian and French
military advisors defending Kigali, 147 the fact of RPF military
superiority had been established beyond dispute and would,
necessarily, determine the course of all future events because
ongoing attempts at settlement of the conflict were no longer
between parties in a military-stalemate. By the time of the
RPF's 1993 assault on Kigali the invading RPF had grown from
the 3,000-4,000 Ugandan "deserters" in late 1990,148 to a light
146 Declassified memo from Robert Flaten, U.S. Ambassador in Rwanda, to
Edmund DeJarnette, U.S. Ambassador in Tanzania (July 8, 1992), available at
http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net.
147 BENJAMIN VALENTINO, FINAL SOLUTIONS: MASS KILLING AND GENO-
CIDE IN THE 20TH CENTURY 181 (2004).
148 Museveni falsely claimed that Uganda had nothing to do with the inva-
sion and that the Ugandan troops under Kagame's command were "desert-
ers," which has been thoroughly de-bunked by numerous sources. For a
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infantry fighting force of at least 20,000 troops with unques-
tioned military superiority. 149
By contrast, the defending FAR had the 6,000-7,000 "real"
troops who had defeated the initial small RPF/Ugandan inva-
sion in late 1990 augmented by some 25-30,000 recent recruits,
which the U.N. commander of U.N. troops, U.N. General Dal-
laire, characterized as "rabble."'150
The RPF victory in its last offensive (January
1993) has affected the morale of the RGF
forces... The general standard of training in the
RGF is low. A period of rapids expansion (from
5,000 to 34,000) during the war was conducted
without an effective training base. Soldiers possess
only basic military skills of varying stan-
dards... The capability of the RGF is assessed as
medium to low. . .A large number of weapons
were lost or stolen during the war.15 '
Not only did this military force imbalance pre-determine the
military outcome of the 100-days of the "Rwanda genocide" fol-
lowing the assassination of the two Presidents in April 1994,152
but it also dictated the outcome of all "Arusha Accords" peace
negotiations in 1993 and 1994.
discussion of the continuous military support provided to the RPF through
Uganda between 1990 and 1994, see generally AMADOU DEME, RWANDA
1994 AND THE FAILURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS: THE WHOLE
TRUTH (2010).
149 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (2004) (Defence Exhibit DB 71.)
This estimate was only the number of troops that Dallaire estimated in Sep-
tember 1993. By April 1994, according to Dallaire's military intelligence of-
ficer Capt. Amadou Deme, Ugandan army regulars added to the RPF troops
observed by Dallaire, so the actual military power wielded by the RPF was
probably much greater than reported by Dallaire in September 1993.
150 ROMEO DALLAIRE, BRENT BEARDSLEY, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE
DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA 70 (2004).
151 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit No. DB-71:
Report of the U.N. Reconnaissance Mission) at 7.
152 See infra notes 209 to 234 and accompany text.
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The "Arusha peace process" was responsible for the 1992
ceasefire, which the RPF assault had broken in February 1993.
In March 1993, the peace process resumed with a new balance
of military power. The negotiations under the new conditions
resulted in the August 1993 "Arusha Accords." This power shar-
ing agreement with the RPF provided for a transitional govern-
ment that included existing political parties as the basis for
multi-party elections in the near future. 153 Although the RPF
represented no more than about 15% of the population that
self-identified as Tutsi, under the Arusha Accords the RPF
would control 50% of the military and an outsized, but still mi-
nority, position in parliament and government ministries.54
Of course, this was a political victory for the RPF who had
been guaranteed a seat at the table of the Rwandan government
and a continuing important role in the combined military force
contemplated in the Accords. However, entering into the
Arusha Accords power-sharing agreement also meant that the
militarily-dominant RPF would eventually have to choose be-
tween surrendering its military superiority in favor of perma-
nent political minority status, and using the militarily dominant
position it had already achieved to seize control of the Rwandan
state, when it ultimately deemed that the time was right. The
events in Rwanda between April and July 1994, reflected in the
previously suppressed U.N. files, make clear that the RPF (quite
sensibly from the standpoint of a superior military power) ap-
parently decided not to trust the negotiated power-sharing to
protect their interests.
Volume+-, Number 1
153 Arusha Peace Agreement, Rwanda RPF, Aug. 4, 1993, available at
http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/pdf/rwan1.pdf.
154 Id.
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February- December 1993: Refugees, Destabilization and The
1993 "Burundi massacres" as Precedent for the 1994
"Rwanda Genocide"
According to the Reconnaissance Report, prepared by U.N.
General Dallaire in September 1993155 as a precursor to U.N.
non-combat peace keepers to replace the French and Belgian
troops that had blocked the RPF advance in February 1993,156
Rwanda was already awash in grenades, guns, deserters and self-
appointed "militias" as a consequence of the war and the suc-
cess of the February 1993 RPF assault:
According to many sources in Kigali, the going
price for a hand grenade in Kigali is as little as $3
and a Kalashnikov is just about as easily obtaina-
ble. Years of conflict in Rwanda, the Uganda war,
the turmoil in Burundi and Zaire have led to a
plethora of military hardware being easily and
cheaply available .... Numbers of gendarmes and
soldiers have deserted and formed loosely knit
groups of bandits. These bandits gravitated to-
wards Kigali where they could more easily blend
in among large of numbers of armed men in
uniforms and have been responsible for much of
the attacks on roads and on houses in and around
Kigali.... Even with the best will in the word, the
gendarmerie are totally inadequate to effectively
combat crime in Rwanda and preserve law and
order.157
155 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit No. DB 71:
Report of the U.N. Reconnaissance Mission), at 16.
156 Intended or not, the replacement of the European troops with UN non-
combatants had the effect of eliminating the only military impediment that
had prevented the RPF takeover of Kigali in February 1993. See Valentino,
supra note 147.
157 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit No. DB 71:
Report of the U.N. Reconnaissance Mission) at 16-17.
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Many of these same conditions were, as U.S. Ambassador
Flaten predicted in 1992,158 to become much worse after the war
resumed in April 1994. They were not, however, unique events
that occurred only after the President's plane was shot down evi-
dencing mass violence following the assassination having been
pre-planned. 159
By the time Dallaire wrote his report in September 1993,
about one-sixth of the total population of eight million6 ° (some
1.2 million Hutu and Tutsi refugees) had been displaced during
the February 1993 assault and were living in squalid refugee
camps outside Kigali and throughout the country. 161 U.S. Am-
bassador to Rwanda, Robert Flaten, testified at the ICTR that
he had seen the appalling conditions of the war-displaced civil-
ians in these camps, 162 which gave millions of Rwandans reason
to believe stories about the brutality of the RPF. In October
1993, hundreds of thousands of Burundian refugees poured into
Rwanda to escape military mass violence against civilians, fol-
lowing a presidential assassination in their own country163 and
was a precursor to predictable mass violence in Rwanda, should
the war resume, according to U.S. Ambassador Flaten in late
1993.164
158 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony of Former Ambassa-
dor to Rwanda, Robert Flaten, June 30-July 1, 2005).
159 See 2010 Mutsinzi Report, supra note 36.
160 Filip Ryentjens, Estimation du nombre de personnes tuees au Rwanda en
1994, in L'AFRIQUE DES GRANDS LACS, ANNUAIRE 1996-1997, 179-186
(Stefaan Marysse and F. Rentjens, Eds., L'Harmattan 1997).
161 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony of Former Ambassa-
dor to Rwanda, Robert Flaten) (June 30-July 1, 2005).
162 Id.
163 See generally memoir of former U.S. Ambassador to Burundi, ROBERT
KRUEGER AND KATHLEEN TOBIN KRUEGER, FROM BLOODSHED TO HOPE IN
BURUNDI (University of Texas Press) (2007) [hereinafter KRUEGER
Memoirs].
164 Id. See also Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony of For-
mer Ambassador to Rwanda, Robert Flaten) (June 30-July 1, 2005).
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The Military-I judges heard evidence from multiple sources
that mass violence that swept Burundi in October 1993, and sim-
ilar mass violence in Rwanda in April 1994, were closely linked
because of the close interconnection between the two neighbor-
ing countries. The neighboring countries with interwoven histo-
ries from pre-colonial times which share similar languages,
ethnicities, religion, and topographies. During the colonial pe-
riod they were even considered a single entity.165 But, the differ-
ences in the political conditions after independence in each
country were significant.
While Rwanda had been a comparatively peaceful Hutu-ma-
jority republic since independence in the early 1960's, Burundi
was ruled by a Tutsi-dominated military dictatorship 166 that car-
ried out several mass killings of hundreds of thousands of Hutus
in the 1970's and 1980's.167 At about the same time that the
Arusha Accords were being signed in August 1993, ostensibly to
bring the Tutsi RPF into the Rwandan government and military,
the first presidential election in Burundi was also taking place.
In the summer of 1993, both countries hoped for peace and de-
mocracy ushered in by the Arusha peace agreement ending the
three-year war in Rwanda, and an electoral process in Burundi
that would end the long-standing military dictatorship. 168 The
first elected Burundian president, a Hutu intellectual named
Melchior Ndadaye, was elected by the 85% Hutu majority in
August 1993, but within 90-days he was assassinated by the
Tutsi-dominated Burundian military.
165 See generally RENt LEMARCHAND, RWANDA AND BURUNDI (London:
Pall Mall 1970).
166 See DALLAIRE, supra note 150, at 87.
167 Id. See generally, RENE LEMARCHAND, BURUNDI: ETHNIC CONFLICT
AND GENOCIDE (Cambridge University Press 1994); RENA LEMARCHAND,
THE DYNAMICS OF VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AFRICA (University of Penn-
sylvania Press 2009).
168 See Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony of Former Am-
bassador to Rwanda, Robert Flaten) (June 30, 2005).
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Violence exploded in Burundi as Hutu peasants rose up with
hand-weapons. 169 Ultimately, the Tutsi military massacred the
Hutu peasantry in the tens of thousands, estimates range from
50,000 to over 100,000 victims. 17o Thus, by the end of 1993,
Rwanda's 8 million people 17' included the homeless, landless,
unemployed refugees internally displaced in February 1993 by
the RPF advance in Rwanda, and several hundred thousand ref-
ugees displaced by the massacres in Burundi in October, all of
whom had stories of RPF/Tutsi military atrocities within their
own villages and families.
Because the much-feared aristocratic-Tutsi RPF had estab-
lished military superiority, in early Rwanda was actually much
more volatile that Burundi had been in October 1993. In addi-
tion, the Burundian example, itself, demonstrated that the Tutsi-
military violently rejected majority-rule elections and engaged
in mass-killings of the Hutu majority, which must certainly have
re-inforced the deep-seated fear of Tutsi domination, described
by Ambassador Flaten. In addition, as General Dallaire re-
ported in September 1993, in Rwanda (unlike Burundi before
violence erupted in October 1993) weapons and armed bandits
were everywhere even before the assassination of majority pres-
idents;172 the economy was in a shambles; and, as described by
Ambassador Flaten, the majority Hutu population was terrified
that renewed domination by the Tutsi aristocracy was
imminent. 173
Ambassador Flaten testified that, after witnessing the mas-
sacres in Burundi he met with then-General Paul Kagame in
November 1993 and personally warned him about the potential
for triggering mass violence in Rwanda, if the Arusha Accords
169 See generally KRUEGER Memoirs, supra note 163.
170 Id.
171 Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship,
103 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 178, 8 (2004).
172 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit No. DB-71:
Report of the U.N. Reconnaissance Mission).
173 See Flaten 1992 memo, supra note 146.
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ceasefire was violated. Flaten testified that he told Kagame and
Habyarimana that if either broke the Arusha Accords ceasefire,
Rwanda would explode in mass violence like Burundi and
leader responsible for breaching the ceasefire would be respon-
sible for the inevitable civilian massacres to follow. 74
Ambassador Flaten was not alone in understanding that the
assassination of Ndadaye and the mass violence in Burundi es-
tablished a dangerous precedent for the Rwandan people. Gen-
eral Dallaire writes in his own memoir that the assassination of
Ndadaye probably made peace impossible in Rwanda, but that
he didn't understand enough about the history or politics of the
region to understand the significance of the assassination of
Ndadaye at the time.175 And, as mentioned earlier, the cable
sent from the State Department Africa desk on the night of
April 6, 1994 to the U.S. Ambassador anticipated that mass vio-
lence could break out in both Rwanda and Burundi.176 Accord-
ing to Military-I Trial evidence, as well as pending criminal
indictments in France 177 and Spain 178 charging Kagame and the
RPF with the presidential assassinations, war crimes, crimes
174 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony of Former Ambassa-
dor to Rwanda, Robert Flaten, June 30-July 1, 2005).
175 DALLAIRE, supra note 150, at 97-114.
176 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT-120:
Memorandum of Prudence Bushnell); Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-
T (Proposed Defence Exhibit DNT 366: Affidavit of UNAMIR Chief Mili-
tary Intelligence Officer Major, Amadou Deme).
177 In November 2006, French Judge Bruguiere issued an indictment for
members of the RPF assassination team that shot down President Haby-
arimana's and triggered the civilian killings. See Military-I Trial, ICTR Case
No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DK-125: Delivrance de mandats d'arret In-
ternationaux, Jean-Louis Bruguiere).
178 In February 2008, Spanish Judge Merelles Abreu issued another detailed
182-page indictment naming Kagame and his followers as responsible for
more than 312,000 civilian deaths. See Memorandum from Roland Amous-
sousa to Michelyne C. St-Laurent (June 10, 2008) [hereinafter French and
Spanish Indictments], available at http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net/
gsdl/collect/comment/index/assoc/HASH4e91.dir/Espana-Audiencia% 20na-
cional-English%20version.pdf.
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against humanity and genocide, Kagame resumed the war in the
manner most likely to trigger mass violence in Rwanda, given
the Burundi experience. 179
c. RPF "Planning and Conspiracy": Planned Assassinations
Trigger Predicted Mass Violence, and a "Blitzkrieg"
Strategy to Seize Power
The evidence in the Military-I Trial runs to thousands of pages
of testimony and documents which can't be completely repli-
cated here, but a few key documents will be quoted or dupli-
cated. However, the ICTR judges who wrote the Military-I
Judgment were presented with a detailed analysis in the
Ntabakuze Brief and the documents are available on the ICTR
website and on the Rwanda Documents Project website.
Successful Long-Term RPF Planning for
Offensive War 1990-1994
In light of historical events that are beyond dispute, the RPF
achieved a rapid increase in the size of its forces from the 3-
4,000 troops that had retreated to the Virunga Mountains in Jan-
uary 1991. By February 1993, the RPF demonstrated military
superiority and by September 1993, it had armed and trained at
least 20,000 light-infantry. The ultimate success of the RPF's
military advance during April-July i994 also conclusively dem-
onstrates an advanced military combat capability and logistical
infrastructure. In just 100 days the RPF moved from controlling
179 As supported by Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defense Ex-
hibit DNT-365: Affidavit of Michael Hourigan); Military-I Trial, ICTR Case
No. 98-41-T (Proposed Defense Exhibit DNT-366: Affidavit of UNAMIR
Chief Military Intelligence Officer Major, Amadou Deme); Sworn Statement
of Retired FBI Special Agent James Lyons (April 6, 2001), available at http://
www.rud-urunana.org/index.asp?op=51&tb=ll&id=208; French and Spanish
indictments, supra note 178. See also DEME, supra note 145.
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only a small area near the northern border of Uganda to exercis-
ing military dominance over the entire country.180
According to testimony of former RPF officers, between the
spring of 1993 and the spring of 1994, the RPF established 3
weapons caches of 200-300 tons each inside Rwanda. l 1 Accord-
ing to Dallaire's military intelligence officer, Capt Amadou
Deme, the inflow of materiel and troops from Uganda increased
markedly in the weeks before April 1994:
A few weeks [before April 6], our team collected
information regarding a massive incursion of
troops, weapons and ammunitions from Uganda
and that those troops were more from the
NRA [the Ugandan army] to support RPF
forces182. . .Furthermore, anyone who would dif-
ferentiate RPF and NRA, meaning Ugandan
forces, is simply proving his dishonesty and
unreliability. .. 183
Among these weapons supplied from Uganda 184 were the mis-
siles that the RPF eventually used to assassinate the two Presi-
dents on the night of April 6, 1994.185 The missiles were
transported to the RPF headquarters, stored in Kagame's per-
180 See Christian Davenport and Alan Stam, What Really Happened in
Rwanda, MILLER-MCCUNE, October 6, 2009, available at http://www.miller-
mccune.com/politics/what-really-happened-in-rwanda-3432. See MADAME
PROSECUTOR supra note 17, at 223; see also Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No.
98-41-T; see also Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit
DNT 216: Abdul Ruzibiza, The Secret History of Rwanda).
181 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony of Lt. Abdul
Ruzibiza, March 9-10, 2006); Military-I, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony
of BRA-1). See also Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Ex-
hibit DNT-216: Lt. Abdul Ruzibiza, The Secret History of Rwanda).
182 See also DEME, supra note 145, at 9.
183 Id. at 28.
184 Dallaire suspected RPF supplies were being transported from Uganda
into Rwanda as early as September 1993. See DALLAIRE, supra note 150, at
88.
185 Id. Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony of Lt. Abdul
Ruzibiza, March 9-10, 2006); Testimony of BRA-1, supra note 181. See also
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sonal quarters to as not to be discovered, then transported to
the RPF base in Kigali disguised in loads of firewoodls6 and put
in place on the night of April 6, after a failed assassination at-
tempt on the night of April 5.187 According to Capt. Deme, after
April 6 the presence of Ugandan troops with RPF troops be-
came even more apparent at RPF headquarters in Kigali:
.. the operations room and the whole CND [RPF
headquarters in Kigali] were crowded with re-
cently arrived military staff... they were different
from regular RPF troops. They were English
speakers with a pronounced accent and green
army fatigues. They were certainly backed by
Ugandan regular army... 188
April 6, 1994: Two Presidents Assassinated and the RPF
"Blitzkrieg" Begins 89
According to a document signed on March 28, 1994 by all par-
ties to the continuing negotiations to implement the Arusha Ac-
cords, including the United States, the Rwandan government,
the Ugandan government and the papal nuncio, the RPF was
obligated to accept minority status and give up its superior mili-
tary position.190 The only party not to sign the agreement was
the RPF.191 An April 1, 1994 cable from the U.S. embassy in
Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony of Lt. Abdul Ruzibiza,
March 9, 2006). See also DEME, supra note 145.
186 DALLAIRE, supra note 150, at 88.
187 Id.
188 DEME, supra note 145, at 101.
189 "The RPF offense ... started in blitzkrieg fashion." See Military-I Trial,
ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT-111: Code Cable MIR 782
from Rom6o Dallaire to Maurice Baril).
190 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT-104:
Joint Statement Allowing CDR to Enter Government). This document re-
flects the countries that had been observing the Arusha Accords negotiations
and implementation process since 1993, or before.
191 Id.
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Kigali to the embassy in Kampala, Uganda made clear that U.S.
State Department policy favored Kagame accepting minority
political status, as did the entire diplomatic community that
signed the document.192 But, according to the testimony of for-
mer RPF officers involved in the operation, on April 1, 1994
Kagame opted to use superior RPF military power and gave the
order to assassinate Habyarimana to members of the shoot-
down crew, who had infiltrated Kigali. 193
According to former RPF officer testifying under a pseudo-
nym,194 on April 4, all RPF commanders from the various com-
bat battalions gathered in the RPF headquarters in Mulindi in
northern Rwanda. The commanders were in position to received
simultaneous orders to launch a final assault when the time
came. During the evening of April 6, while the troops and com-
manders were gathered in a common room watching the Africa
Cup match, a messenger came into the room and whispered in
Kagame's ear. He left the room with his security detail, returned
in 15 to 20 minutes and announced that Habyarimana had been
killed and that the assault to seize power had begun. 195
This order for the final assault on the night of April 6, 1994
was given within minutes of the assassination of the Presidents,
and long before any violent reactions could have occurred in
192 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T, (Defence Exhibit DT-121: Code
Cable from US Ambassador Rawson in Kigali to U.S. Embassy in Kampala,
Uganda).
193 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony of Lt. Abdul
Ruzibiza, March 9-10, 2006); Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testi-
mony of Lt. Abdul Ruzibiza, March 9, 2006). RPF infiltration of Kigali, as
well as many institutions including the military and the "militias" associated
with political parties, was confirmed in the testimony of former RPF officer
Aloys Ruyenzi in ICTR testimony in November 2010.
194 For security of this witness, who testified in closed session and who is in
asylum outside of Rwanda, the name and dates of testimony are being ex-
cluded by the author.
195 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony of Lt. Abdul
Ruzibiza, March 9-10, 2006); Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testi-
mony of Lt. Abdul Ruzibiza, March 9, 2006); Military-I Trial, ICTR CASE
NO.-98-41-T (Testimony of BRA-1).
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Kigali in reaction. 196 Confirmation that the RPF assault actually
began within minutes of the assassination of the two Presidents
was also confirmed by former Chief of U.N. military intelli-
gence, Captain Amadou Deme, whose quarters were close to
the RPF base at the CND in Kigali. According to Deme, the
sound of aimed shots, as opposed to random, began in the valley
area behind the RPF base long before FAR troops came out of
their bases later that night, or early the next morning. 197
On the night of April 6, the RPF commanders returned to
their units to begin the assault and within two-weeks, the east-
ern one-third of Rwanda (from the northeastern border to the
southeastern border) was under RPF control. Meanwhile, the
6,000-7,000 FAR "fighting troops" of the Rwandan government
were tied down defending Kigali and Ruhengeri in the north-
west, as part of the RPF strategy to eliminate meaningful resis-
tance in the rest of the country. 98 As Dallaire predicted, the
new recruit "rabble" provided little organized resistance in the
rest of the country as the highly efficient RPF swept them from
their path. On April 24, 1994, Dallaire met Kagame at his Mu-
lindi headquarters to ask why his highly organized troops
seemed to be more interested in seizing territory than saving
lives. According to Dallaire's report of the meeting, Kagame
told Dallaire that the civilian deaths were, in effect, collateral
damage for his war plan. 99
We entered into a discussion of the situation on
the battleground... there was no doubt Kagame
196 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony of Lt. Abdul
Ruzibiza, March 9-10, 2006).
197 DEME, supra note 145, at 57-59.
198 See Davenport and Stam, supra note 180; MADAME PROSECUTOR supra
note 17, at 223; Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Testimony of Lt.
Abdul Ruzibiza, March 9-10, 2006); Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T
(Testimony of Lt. Abdul Ruzibiza, March 9, 2006).
199 See DALLAIRE & BEARDSLEY, supra note 56; see also Military-I Trial,
IRTC Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT-187: Code Cable from Ro-
m6o Dallaire to Kofi Annan).
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had pinned down with minimum effort, a number
of RGF battalions defending the Ruhengeri Hutu
heartland. This permitted him, after seizing By-
umba.. .to proceed south as far as the Tanzanian
border and seal it up at the river. Concurrently, he
was moving his assault forces west, below, Kigali
on the main axis of the paved road to the capital.
Kigali was clearly being surrounded for a show-
down.. .I had asked Kagame why he wasn't going
straight for the jugular in Kigali, and he ignored
the implications of my question. He knew full well
that every day of fighting on the periphery meant
certain death for Tutsi still behind RPF lines.200
A similar conclusion was drawn by Dallaire's chief of military
intelligence, Capt. Amadou Deme:
For weeks, [the] RPF seemed to have frozen its
offensive over Kigali itself and was just putting
pressure on the city with heavy shelling. Of
course... that was giving enough time... and ca-
pacity to criminals to still carry on their killings on
civilians... [the] RPF did not put efforts to.. .bring
an end to the killings of civilians...201
The details of this rapid "blitzkrieg" style advance were shown
on maps during trial,2°2 which has been duplicated by Professor
Alan Stam of University of Michigan and Professor Christian
Davenport of the University of Notre Dame who have tracked
the day-by-day RPF military advance of the RPF in a power-
point on their website.2°3
200 DALLAIRE, supra note 150, at 327.
201 DEME, supra note 145, at 157.
202 See Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Testimony of Lt. Abdul Ruzibiza).
(2006) See also, Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT-216).
203 See Genodynamics website showing daily progress of the RPF assault at
http://www.genodynamics.org.
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The fact of the "blitzkrieg" advance reveals RPF military
planning and provisioning.20 4 The style of warfare itself, then, is
evidence of "long-term planning" and highly organized supply
lines and regular sources of supplies. Between early 1991 and
April 1994 when the "blitzkrieg" was successfully launched, for-
mer RPF officers testified that the RPF continued to plan offen-
sive military actions and to receive large amounts of military
supplies through their supply lines in Uganda.205 These supply
lines enabled the RPF to carry out offensive military actions on
a large scale, as confirmed by the U.N. chief of military intelli-
gence Captain Amadou Deme.206
After Burundi-like Massacres Sweep Rwanda, Reports of
Kagame/RPF Crimes Begin to Mount
In addition to destabilizing the entire country to facilitate its
military offensive, the assassination of President Habyarimana
brought another advantage to the RPF as well. The senior mem-
bers of the Rwandan military staff were also on the plane and
were killed along with the President.2 7 In just one stroke, both
the government and the military were de-stabilized and had to
be re-organized at the same time that they had to defend against
the RPF advance in the largely undefended eastern part of the
country.208 To make matters even more challenging, Burundi-
204 Raymond Bonner, How Minority Tutsi Won the War, N.Y. TIMES, Sep-
tember 6, 1994.
205 See Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Testimony of Lt. Abdul Ruzibiza).
See also, Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT-216); Mili-
tary-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Testimony of BRA-1).
206 DEME, supra note 145, at 100-102. Capt. Deme also catalogues some 15
factors he observed that caused him to conclude that the RPF intended to
resume their assault for power long before April 6, 1994. See Id. at 152-3.
207 Id. at 57. Also on board were the joint chief of staff of the Rwandan
army, General Deogratias Nsabimana, the President's chief of the cabinet,
Colonel Sagatwa, and Major Bagaragaza. See Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T
(Defence Exhibits DB 103B1 and DB 103B2: Communique from the Minis-
ter of Defence).
208 What Really Happened in Rwanda, supra note 35.
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like mass communal violence had started to break out in various
parts of the country, as U.S. Ambassador Flaten had
predicted.20 9
In fact, because of the differences in military capability, ac-
cording to U.N. documents put into evidence through their au-
thor U.N. General Dallaire, the defending FAR army
repeatedly requested a ceasefire or the assistance of the RPF to
form a single army to quell the civilian violence triggered by the
assassination of the Presidents. The FAR military acknowledged
that it did not have the capacity to defend against the RPF as-
sault and to put down the massacres at the same time, as noted
by U.N. military intelligence chief, Captain Deme:210
.. all requests for a truce were refused by the RPF
because their war machine was already en route
[the FAR/RGF] were simply not able to face an
offensive, destructive, fast, well-supported enemy
to focus on the interior of the country to help or-
ganize and fight against the perpetrators of the
killings. . .[the FAR/RGF] simply could not do
both.. .having responsibility of the integrity of the
territory and destabilizing order inside... the RPF
[should have] accept truce for humanitarian life-
saving purposes because they were facing major
and generalized killings of... both ethnic groups.
Failing to do so was a crime against humanity
[t]hat was simply immoral.
The FAR requests for a ceasefire began on the night of the as-
sassinations on April 6 and continued during the entire 100-
days:
That evening [April 12, 1994] Brent [Beardsley]
brought me a copy of a communique commande-
209 See Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Testimony of Former Ambassador to
Rwanda, Robert Flaten).
210 DEME, supra note 145, at 29.
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ment des forces armees Rwandaises, it pleaded for
a face-to-face meeting between Gatsinzi and
Kagame.. .they stated there was too much killing,
and they were submitting to an unconditional sur-
render.. .I applauded the courage it took to make
it, and their desire to stop the war...211
But, General Dallaire concluded within the following week that
Kagame would not agree to a ceasefire to put down the mas-
sacres because "he was winning the war" 212 for complete control
over the entire country. According to Dallaire, the RPF refused
to accept any proposal from the interim government. .."[t]he
RPF, winners on the battlefield so far, would never agree to
these RGF points." 213
At least one of these ceasefire requests from the Rwandan
government to the RPF was conveyed through the U.N. on
April 30, 1994, after negotiations in Nairobi. Gen. Dallaire met
with Kagame to convey yet another ceasefire proposal. Accord-
ing to Dallaire, Kagame "was not going to be happy with any
reinforcement of UNAMIR that looked like an intervention
force. With the ceasefire going nowhere fast and his successes
mounting on the battlefield, it was obvious why he wouldn't
be." 214 According to Dallaire, Kagame also threatened to attack
U.N. troops, if the Security Council should send in "peace-mak-
ers" to save the refugees being killed because of the war, and
Kagame also denied that the killings were ethnically motivated:
The UN is looking at sending an intervention
force on humanitarian grounds, but for what rea-
son? Those that were to die are already dead. If an
211 DALLAIRE & BEARDSLEY, supra note 56 at 292.
212 See Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT-187: April 24,
1994 Code Cable from Rom6o Dallaire to Kofi Annan); Military-I Trial,
ICTR-98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT-111: April 17, 1994 Code Cable MIR
782 from Rom6o Dallaire to Baril). See also, DALLAIRE & BEARDSLEY,
supra note 56, at 311.
213 DALLAIRE & BEARDSLEY, supra note 56, at 340.
214 Id. at 342.
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intervention force is sent to Rwanda we will fight it.
Let us resolve the problem of the Rwandans. This
force is to protect the criminals in power. The in-
ternational community cannot event condemn the
massacres of poor innocent people. It is presenting
the Rwandan problem as an ethnic one, which is
incorrect as the massacres were against Tutsi and
the opposition... The SRSG (the U.N. representa-
tive) is not welcome anymore in Rwanda. We do
not recognize him, and if he stays we will cease to
collaborate with the UN.215
The documentary evidence and the testimony in the Military-I
Trial show that the "hero" of the Rwandan genocide," Paul
Kagame: triggered the mass violence by assassinating two presi-
dents after having been warned by U.S. Ambassador Flaten of
the consequences of resuming the war; refused to agree to a
ceasefire to permit FAR troops to put down the massacres after
they began; refused to permit RPF troops to put down the mas-
sacres in favor of his war-plan to seize total power; and,
threatened to attack U.N. forces that might be sent to Rwanda
to stop the massacres. And, in the midst of the "Rwanda geno-
cide," he denied that the mass killings were ethnically
motivated.
Evidence of Other RPF Crimes Prior to April-July 1994
Evidence of the assassinations of the two Presidents was not
the only RPF crime evidence that was put into the record in the
Military-I Trial. The U.N. documents also showed that as early
as May 17, 1994, the U.N. High Commission for Refugees began
receiving reports of mass killings by RPF troops in the eastern
one-third of Rwanda. The following are excerpts of a UNHCR-
Ngara protection report, made on May 14-15:
215 Id.
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The presence of the RPF at the border and across
the border... raises critical security concerns...
At Rusomo commune, sector Kigarama, the
RPF. . .called for a "peace meeting."Those who
did not participate voluntarily were forced to the
meeting. At the school people were tied together,
three by three by three - women and children -
and stabbed. The bodies were put on trucks and
thrown into the Kagera River ....
" At.. .sectors Nyamugari, Gisenyi, Nyarubuje,
the RPF comes at 05h00... the villagers are
caught and taken away to the river by trucks.
No one has returned. Refugees in the area
have seen people being tied together and
thrown into the river. It seems guns are only
used if somebody tries to escape ...
" At.. .sector Muzaza,. . .the RPF launched sev-
eral attacks on the village and its population.
On 13.05 40 RPF soldiers... surrounded the
village. Villagers were gathered in houses,
which were burned down. An eye witness saw
20 people burned this way. 8 villagers were
thrown into a latrine and the latrine was filled
with soil. Asked by UNCHR field officer ref-
ugees said that RPF did not care whether the
victims were hutu or tutsi villagers...
" On 15.05.. .a group of Rwandan people were
observed running away from 20-35
soldiers... some jumped into the river. One
person drowned. The soldiers rounded up a
group of civilians and marched them off...
" An IRC staff person wrote to their office:
"Things are getting very bad at the border
here. . .Each day there are more and more
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bodies in the river and most of them without
their heads; the count is between 20 to 30
each 30 minutes...
* We believe that only Tanzania... only border
open to refugees - Zaire has been closed to
them; ... Burundi are undesirable because of
RPF presence and instability... RPF atroci-
ties on the other side of the river will force
people to flee...
We will be overwhelmed here unless someone takes action to
end the bloodshed, the atrocities, the massacres, in Rwanda 216.
Even before the RPF resumed its assault to seize power on
April 6, 1994, investigating and reporting on crimes in RPF-con-
trolled areas was extremely problematic because the RPF exer-
cised absolute control over information in these areas. As
discussed in a report issued by Amnesty International in Octo-
ber 1994:
Amnesty International has known for years that
the RPF closely monitored and controlled move-
ments of foreigners in areas under its control.
Journalists and representatives of humanitarian
organizations rarely talked to Rwandan citizens
under the control of the RPF without an RPF offi-
cial being present .... However, Amnesty Interna-
tional has received numerous reports of human
rights abuses committed by the RPA since the war
in Rwanda began in October 1990. These have in-
cluded hundreds of deliberate and arbitrary kill-
ings or possible extrajudicial executions and
disappearances... reports of civilian supporters of
the RPF being allowed to kill opponents.217
216 Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT-259: UNCHR Re-
port of RPF killings at Rusomo Bridge to Tanzania, over Kagera River, in
southeastern Rwanda) (emphasis added).
217 See Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT 258).
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Reports from Human Rights Watch from September 1994 de-
scribed additional RPF crimes, committed before the RPF
seized state power in mid-July 1994:218
" At Kimuvu parish. . .priests were evacuated
when RPF soldiers arrived to make camp on the
grounds. When the priests returned in July, they
found a considerable number of bodies. Appar-
ently, the victims, whose arms had been bound,
had been assembled for interrogation by the
soldiers and had been beaten to death. The
priests organized the burial of the bodies in
three large mass graves which were located and
photographed by Human Rights Watch/Africa.
* On July 13, in the southern town of Butare, RPF
soldiers gathered several hundred displaced per-
sons. . .most or all of the men have not been
heard from since. The men were detained in the
veterinary school... Witnesses related that for a
period of two days there were sounds of people
being killed in the woods next to the school.
Not even the U.N. forces were able to get information on RPF
activities behind their lines, before or after April 1994, as de-
scribed by U.N. Capt. Deme:
... there never has been, even once, free move-
ment of the UNAMIR or previous GOMN [bor-
der military observers] in [the] RPF zone. Even
the Force Commander [General Dallaire] would
never have been granted of such lib-
erty... although he was authorized under his man-
date at the Uganda/Rwanda border to monitor the
movement of troops, ammunitions, and weapons
on a few number of crossing points... that were
218 Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT 261).
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officially recognized.219 This [NRA troops at RPF
headquarters in Kigali after April 6] made me
think of the total refusal of [the] RPF regarding
the principle of conducting joint patrols with RGF
(FAR) military and UNAMIR along the DMZ...
That made sense if the RPF had on its agenda the
idea of resuming hostilities.220
The total control of information in areas controlled by the RPF
was not an accident. President Kagame has boasted that RPF
skill in managing information to its benefit was part of the RPF
arsenal of weapons.
We used communication and information warfare
better than anyone. We have found a new way of
doing things.221
The inability to get information from behind RPF lines made
total control of information regarding RPF crimes possible, but
the evidence of the RPF crimes began to leak out and was re-
corded in the suppressed U.N. "Rwanda Genocide Papers."
Evidence of RPF Crimes Committed After July 1994
As described by Amnesty International, getting independent
information from behind RPF was extremely difficult.222 The
documents secured from the U.N. also established that in Au-
gust 1994 the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees compiled
the only known independent human rights investigation from
any area controlled by the RPF before, during or after the war.
Robert Gersony, a U.S. State Department Human Rights inves-
219 DEME, supra note 145, at 28.
220 Id. at 101.
221 Reyntjens, supra note 35, at 199 n.85-93 (citing NIK GOWING, NEW
CHALLENGES, AND PROBLEMS FOR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN COM-
PLEX EMERGENCIES: OMINOUS LESSONS FROM THE GREAT LAKES AND
EASTERN ZAIRE IN LATE 1996 AND EARLY 1997 (May 1998), available at
http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show-metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:1848).
222 See Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT 258).
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tigator paid for by the USAID (United States Agency for Inter-
national Development) and assigned to UNHCR (United
Nations High Commission for Refugees), managed to spend
July and August behind RPF lines. He reported to the U.N.
High Commissioner Madame Sadako Ogata, that the RPF was
killing thousands of civilians a month in military-style
executions223
Versions of this "Gersony Report," 224 which detailed massive
RPF killings, was given to the U.N.'s Madame Ogata, Kofi An-
nan, and others, as well as the U.S. State Department's Brian
Atwood, George Moose and then Secretary of State Warren
Christopher. A memorandum from the Undersecretary of State
for Africa, George F. Moose notified U.S. Secretary of State
Warren Christopher that the RPF was in the process of commit-
ting war crimes when the memo was sent in September 1994:
A UNCHR investigative team that spent July and
August in Rwanda (i.e. Gersony) has reported sys-
tematic human rights abuses by the GOR (i.e.
RPF) forces - including systematic killings - in the
south and southeast of the country. The team has
concluded that the GOR (RPF author) is aware of
these reprisals against Hutu civilians and may have
sanctioned them ....
On the basis of interviews with refugees/individu-
als, the UNHCR team concluded that a pattern of
killing had emerged. The RPA convened meetings
of displaced persons to discuss peace and security.
Once the displaced persons were assembled, RPA
soldiers moved in and killed them. In addition to
these massacres, the RPA engaged in house to
house sweeps and hunted down individuals hiding
223 Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DK-112).
224 Isabelle Vichniac, Un rapport confidentiel faisat 6tat de la mort de 30,000
Hutus, La controverse persiste sur les allegations du HCR, LE MONDE, Oct.
10, 1994.
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in camps. Victims were usually killed with hoes,
axes, machetes and with fire. Although males 18-
40 were at highest risk the young and elderly were
not spared. The team estimated that the RPA and
Tutsi civilian surrogates had killed 10,000 or more
Hutu civilians per month, with the RPA account-
ing for 95% of the killing. (emphasis added)
The UNHCR team speculated that the purpose of
the killing was a campaign of ethnic cleansing in-
tended to clear areas in the south of Rwanda for
Tutsi habitation. The killings also served to reduce
the population of Hutu males and discouraged ref-
ugees from returning to claim their land.225
This memorandum shows that by mid-September 1994, the U.S.
Secretary of State knew that the RPF was committing mass
crimes which were either war crimes, crimes against humanity,
or genocide. However, to date, no one in the RPF has ever been
held accountable for these crimes.
Former RPF Foreign Minister Jean Marie Ndagijimana's testi-
mony at the ICTR confirms that both the upper levels of U.N.
and U.S. government were well aware of the crimes being sys-
tematically committed by the RPF no later than September
1994.226 Ndagijimana was a diplomat in the former Rwandan
Government. He had been at his new post in the RPF Rwandan
government for only a month in September 1994 when he at-
tended meetings at the U.N. and Washington wherein Kofi An-
nan and representatives of the State Department informed him
of the RPF crimes reported by Gersony. He testified he was not
willing to take part in a cover-up of the crimes of a government
he had just joined. Instead, Ndagijimana resigned immediately
and went into exile.227 According to a recent report to the Brit-
225 Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DT-264).
226 Id.
227 Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Testimony of Former RPF Foreign Minis-
ter Jean-Marie Ndagijimana).
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ish Commonwealth regarding Rwanda's membership in the
Commonwealth:
Kagame had the powerful support of the United
States of America and the United Kingdom, as
well as the UN. This is best illustrated by the Ger-
sony report "incident". . .His report was scruti-
nized and forwarded by the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Ms. Sadako Ogata... UN Sec-
retary General Boutros -Ghali became very con-
cerned about the impact on the UN. He ensured
that the report was not published, and initiated the
process of de-legitimising Gersony's findings, with
the approval of the United States of America. Kofi
Annan.. .was instructed to follow up, and to en-
sure that the report was not made public. .. .There
certainly were crimes against humanity in that pe-
riod within the ICTR jurisdiction, but powerful in-
ternational forces in collusion with the RPF
ensured that the ICTR took no action.228
Evidence put into the Military-I Trial record from contemporary
news reports indicates that RPF crimes were not limited to the
areas investigated by Robert Gersony. Following the RPF
seizure of power in July 1994, a million or more Hutu refugees
escaped to the Congo.229 Refugees who attempted to return to
Rwanda reported to the New York Times that RPF killings
greeted them on their return.230
228 COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, RWANDA'S APPLICATION
FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMONWEALTH: REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE 33 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/hradvocacy/rwanda
%27s-application for membership-ofthecommonwealth.pdf.
229 See Reyntjens, supra note 35, at 194-97 (discussing RPF crimes dating
from 1992 and continuing through publication of the article in 2004). See also
Douglas Jehl, Pact Reached on Return of Rwandans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
1995; Dilip Gahuly, Hutu Bodies in Akagera River, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 31,
1994.
230 See Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT-260A).
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RPF Crimes Now in the Public Record 1993-Present
In November 2007, French Judge Bruguiere issued an indict-
ment for members of the RPF assassination team that shot
down President Habyarimana's and triggered the civilian kill-
ings.231 And, in February 2008, Spanish Judge Merelles Abreu
issued another detailed 182-page indictment232 naming Kagame
and his followers as responsible for more than 312,000 civilian
deaths.
" Kigali-19,331 dead;
" Kigali Rural- 37,410 dead;
* Gitarama-39,912 dead;
" Butare-33,433 dead;
" Gikongo-17,545 dead;
" Kibuye-23,775 dead;
• Gisenyi-3,100 dead;
" Ruhengeri-8,750 dead;
" Byumba-73,365 dead;
" Kibungo (site of Gersony's investigations) -39,745 dead.
Because the U.N. Tribunal concerns itself only with crimes com-
mitted during 1994, the crimes committed by the RPF after 1994
were not relevant to the ICTR proceedings, but the evidence of
massive crimes in the public record continues to mount. In April
1995, upwards of 10,000 unarmed refugees, mainly women and
children, were massacred at the Kibeho refugee camp in south-
western Rwanda.233 In 1996 and 1998 Rwandan and Ugandan
armies invaded the Congo, ostensibly to root out "genocidaires"
who had escaped and were living among refugees there.
231 See Military-I Trial, ICTR-98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DK-125).
232 Merelles indictment, supra note 178.
233 See Reyntjens, supra note 35, at 194-97.
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However, U.N. Security Council-commissioned expert reports
of 2001234, 2002235, 2003236 and December 2008237 reveal that
these invasions have actually been a cover for the illegal ex-
ploitation of resources in the eastern Congo which has greatly
increased the wealth of Rwandan and Ugandan Elites. Most re-
cently, the 600-page report, compiled for the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Human Rights and recently leaked to LeMonde
and the New York Times, 238 documents crimes committed by
RPF troops in the Congo. The Report discusses not only illegal
exploitation of resources but also the commission of war crimes,
crimes against humanity and "genocide against Hutus." 239
d. Evidence of the U.S.-Engineered ICTR Cover-up
The publication of the English language edition of Carla Del
Ponte's memoir in February 2009240 explains exactly how the
U.S. State Department engineered the one-sided victor's tribu-
nal at the ICTR. Del Ponte details that she was sacked in 2003
for her willingness to prosecute the RPF at the ICTR.241 The
cover-up of RPF crimes, however, began long before Ms. Del
Ponte was relieved of her duties in 2003.242 .
By the time Del Ponte had made her opening statement in the
ICTR Military-I trial, she had already received Judge
234 U.N. S.C. Panel of Experts Rep. on the Illegal Exploitation of the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 (Oct. 16, 2002).
235 U.N. S.C. Panel of Experts Rep. on the Illegal Exploitation of National
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1146 (Oct. 20, 2003).
236 U.N. S.C. Panel of Group of Experts Rep. on the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2004/551 (Jul. 15, 2004).
237 U.N. S.C. Panel of Experts Final Rep. on the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2008/773 (Dec. 12, 2008).
238 See Congo Mapping Reports, supra note 53. See also, Jason Stearns, supra
note 7.
239 See Congo Mapping Reports, supra note 53.
240 MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17, at 372.
241 Id. at 233.
242 Id. at 191-92.
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Brugui~re's confirmation of Kagame's culpability for Haby-
arimana's assassination.243 Del Ponte's predecessor, Louise Ar-
bour, had long participated in covering-up Kagame's
involvement in the assassination of the two Presidents as former
ICTR Chief Investigative Prosecutor, Australian Queen's Prose-
cutor Michael Hourigan's affidavit describes:244
In late January, or early February 1997, members
of the National Team were approached by three
informants, either former or serving members of
the RPF) claimed direct involvement in the 1994
fatal rocket attack on the President's aircraft.
Their evidence specifically implicated the direct
involvement of President Paul Kagame...
I informed Judge Arbour in considerable detail
about the information implicating President
Kagame...
Judge Arbour then advised me that the National
Team investigation was at an end because in her
view it was not in our mandate... [and] asked me
if the memo I prepared was the only copy. I in-
formed her it was and she said she was pleased
to hear that and placed it in her office filing
cabinet... a short time later I resigned from the
ICTR.245
In the fall of 1994, just after Gersony reported mass RPF crimes,
Kofi Annan and other U.N. officials attended meetings in Nai-
robi. U.N. documents report that the purpose of these meetings
was to devise a way to suppress the contents of the Gersony
243 Id.
244 This description of events is supported by a public statement by former
FBI Special Agent James Lyons and former UNAMIR Military Intelligence
Officer Amadou Deme, both of whom served with Hourigan on the National
Team. See Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Proposed Defence Ex-
hibit DNT 366). See generally, DEME, supra note 145.
245 See Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DNT 365).
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report because the report would be "embarrassing to the U.N.
and the Rwandan government." 246 Within the ICTR Prosecu-
tor's office this was far from a secret. According to Prof. Filip
Reyntjens, formerly an expert witness for the ICTR
prosecution:
Although it was clear that the RPF had committed
crimes that fell squarely within the mandate of the
ICTR247, the risk of impunity for the victors was
apparent from the early days of the tribunal's op-
eration. During a conversation with the first Pros-
ecutor, Richard Goldstone, in July 1996, I asked
him whether he intended to prosecute RPF sus-
pects. Irritated, he replied he saw no reason for
doing so. When I told him that there was compel-
ling prima facie evidence of these crimes, he got
even more irritated and stated emphatically that
there was no such prima facie evidence. That was
the end of our brief conversation. Clearly, the
OTP [Office of the Prosecutor] was not starting its
operation with an open mind, and this mindset has
handicapped it ever since.
In April 2003, towards the end of Carla Del
Ponte's term as Prosecutor, I was in Arusha to-
gether with Alison Des Forges to run a seminar
for OTP staff. We were brought in contact with
the so-called "special investigations" team, put in
place to work on the "second mandate", the one
related to crimes committed by the RPF. The team
wanted to discuss evidence and strategy. We were
quite impressed by their work: they had assembled
extensive data on between 15 and 20 massacres by
246 See Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (Defence Exhibit DK-112).
247 This was already unequivocally stated in the May 1994 report of UN spe-
cial rapporteur Ren6 Degni-Segui. See Filip Reyntjens, Governance in Post-
Genocide Rwanda, 9 AFR. AFFAIRS 1 (Jan. 2010).
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the RPF. As it was unlikely that all these could be
prosecuted, we exchanged on selecting files that
could as a priority be formulated as indictments;
and we agreed on four cases: Butare (in particular
the killings at the agro-veterinary school and in
the arboretum) upon the arrival of the RPF in
July; the regional stadium of Byumba in April;
Giti, an atypical municipality as no Tutsi were
killed there, also in April; and Gakurazo, where
the RPF killed bishops, other clergy and civilians
in June. For all these cases, there is a great deal of
evidence and the suspects are known. At the end
of our meetings, we felt confident that indictments
could soon be issued. More than six years later,
nothing has happened. 248
Moreover, the Gersony report was not the only suppressed re-
port of RPF crimes in Rwanda in 1994. U.N. human rights inves-
tigator Roberto Garreton, a well-known Chilean lawyer who
was to play an active role in the prosecution of Chilean dictator
Pinochet in 1999 apparently submitted a report to the Security
Council regarding RPF crimes in Rwanda in 1996, which was
also suppressed.249 But, prosecution of the RPF is not on ICTR
Prosecutor's agenda25o, despite all of the evidence that showed
that: there never was a "long-planned conspiracy to commit ge-
nocide" by the former military and government;251 the RPF
leaders were always the militarily superior aggressors; 252 that
248 Filip Reyntjens, "Prosecutorial Policies in the ICTR: Ensuring Impunity
for the Victors," (Monograph, Institute of Development Policy and Manage-
ment, University of Antwerp (July 30, 2010).
249 Michell Faul, A second Rwanda genocide is revealed in Congo: UN Re-
port ties Tutsi soldiers to deaths of thousands of Hutus, Oct. 10, 2010 at http://
www.msnbc.com.
250 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
251 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (2004) (Testimony of Robert
Flaten).
252 Davenport, supra note 179; see also Military I, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T
(2004) (Defense Exhibit DNT-216); Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T
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Paul Kagame ordered the assassination of the two Presidents;253
and, that Kagame took advantage of the predicted communal
violence that followed to seize power.254
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ICTR "VICTOR'S IMPUNITY"
FOR AFRICA AND U.S. INFLUENCE IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD
Of course, common logic and experience teaches that the
Rwanda War could not be the only war in history in which only
the vanquished committed crimes. The one-sided prosecutions
at the ICTR provide irrefutable evidence that the tribunal pro-
ceedings have been manipulated to ensure impunity for the
crimes committed by the RPF and Paul Kagame. But, the reve-
lations of Carla Del Ponte255 and Florence Hartmann256 make
speculation unnecessary as to the source and nature of the be-
hind-the-scenes manipulation. The government of the United
States of America has provided Paul Kagame and the RPF with
impunity for massive crimes for years and has muzzled and pros-
ecuted former ICTR officials who have told the truth about the
functioning of the ICTR. The question is, why would both Re-
(2004) (Defense Exhibit DB-71) p.12; see also KINZER, supra note 134;
WAUGH, supra note 34.
253 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
254 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (2005) (Defence Exhibit DNT-
111).
255 MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 17; see also Katie Paul, Silent War-
rior: She's Faced Down the Mob and Genocidal Dictators. So Why is Carla
Del Ponte Barred from Discussing Her Own Book?, NEWSWEEK WEB, Feb.
27, 2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2009/02/26/silent-waffior.
html.
256 HARTMANN, supra note 18; see also Former ICTY Spokesperson in Dock
for Contempt of Court, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 28, 2008, available
at http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/43/310/; see also Hague Court
Charges Ex-Official: A Former Spokesperson for the United Nations War
Crimes Court in the Hague Has Been Charged With Revealing Confidential
Information, BBC NEWS, Oct. 28, 2008.
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publican and Democratic administrations go to such lengths to
protect Kagame over some 15-years?
The only possible conclusion is that U.S. policy-makers must
consider maintaining deniability of the crimes of Mr. Kagame's
regime as extremely important to U.S. interests. But, Rwanda is
not blessed with strategic minerals, or a strategically significant
location (except as a launching point for extending military and
commercial activities into the heart of the extraordinarily re-
source-rich eastern Congo)257 that would explain such unwaver-
ing U.S. support in the face of this evidence of the repeated
commission of mass crimes by Kagame's RPF.258 The answer
may lie in the apparent contradictions between Pentagon and
State Department approaches to RPF support prior to the RPF
seizure of power in July 1994. The U.N. and U.S. government
documents in the Military-I record, as well as those on the
Rwanda Documents Project website, provide a hint that the
source of U.S. interest in protecting the Kagame regime may
have arisen from the apparent contradiction between Pentagon
military support for Kagame between 1990 and 1994, and State
Department policy encouraging a non-military resolution of the
Rwanda war.2 5
9
While State Department policy between 1991-1994 was to
support the Arusha Accords peace agreement and RPF accept-
ance of minority political status,260 the rapid growth of RPF
forces between 1991 and 1993 and the continuing military sup-
port flowing through U.S. /U.K. - supported Uganda between
1992 and July 1994, suggest that the State Department and Pen-
tagon were acting at cross-purposes with respect to the balance
of power in Rwanda. In retrospect, at the same time the State
257 See infra note 282.
258 Stearns supra note 7.
259 See J. Bryan Atwood & M. Peter McPherson, Arrested Development:
Making Foreign Aid More Effective, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2008 (dis-
cussing the problem of outsized Pentagon influence on foreign policy).
260 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (2004) (Defence Exhibit DT-
121).
Volume +, Number I
R WAN DA TRIFBUNAL?O5
tal I 1-01
73
Erlinder: The UN Security Council Ad Hoc Rwanda Tribunal: International Jus
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
Department was advocating compromise and acceptance of mi-
nority political status by the RPF prior to April 1994, the Penta-
gon apparently was assisting the RPF to develop and enlarge its
military capability to achieve dominance which, by February
1993, made compromise and relinquishing RPF military superi-
ority much less likely.
The public record provides confirmation of continuing Penta-
gon/RPF collaboration and cooperation both before and after
the "Rwandan genocide". According to the U.N. chief of intelli-
gence, Capt. Deme, a company of U.S. Marines and helicopters
was in Burundi not later than April 8, 1994, which suggests that
the command decision to send them there must have occurred
either before, or very shortly after, April 6, 1994.261 And, these
military assets must have been moved from elsewhere in Africa,
or from outside Africa, which implies that the Pentagon may
well have had foreknowledge of instability breaking out in
Rwanda before it occurred on April 6. Then within days of the
RPF seizure of power in Kigali on July 19, 1994, U.S. troops
landed in Kigali in tacit support of the new regime,262 which
could only occur if the Pentagon had prior contacts with the
RPF which U.S. commanders considered positive enough to rely
on the bona fides of the untested regime, despite the chaos of
the 100-days following the assassination of the Presidents. The
Pentagon respect for Kagame as a military leader was clearly
expressed, shortly after the assassination of the two presidents
and the RPF resumption of the war, was expressed in the Wash-
ington Post on April 27, 1994 by Colonel Jim McDonough, a
U.S. Special Forces commander who later went to Rwanda in
1996-7, while Rwanda troops were invading the Congo for the
first time. According to McDonough, Kagame was ". . .an intel-
Volumel+, Number I
261 DEME, supra note 145, at 75.
262 Tony Leonard, U.S. Troops Arrive in Rwanda for Relief Effort, SEATTLE
TIMES, July 31, 1994.
Fall 2010
20+
DPau[ Journal for Social Justice ZO+
74
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol4/iss1/6
lectual figure. I would rate him as a first rate operational
fighter. .. 263
But, the close connection between Kagame's RPF and the
Pentagon appears in the public record in other ways, as well.
Not only had Kagame received training at the U.S. Army Staff
College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas in 1990, but one of his class-
mates Major Anthony Marley was the U.S. military observer at
the Arusha Accords negotiations, 264 following the RPF assault
in February 1993 which established RPF military dominance, in
fact. It seems unlikely that Marley did not grasp the implications
of RPF military superiority, in light of Ambassador Flaten's as-
sessment of the political consequences of RPF military success,
as early as 1992.265
Marley's admiration for the command skills of Kagame, and
presumably the Pentagon's, were apparently undiminished by
Kagame's role the presidential assassinations, the assault to
seize power in Rwanda, or the invasions of Congo in 1996 and
1998 because, at a 1998 conference on "peace and security in
Africa," Marley wrote:
One reason why American officials are enamored
of Rwandan [then] vice-president Kagame is that
he knows how to communicate with them in a
quintessentially American way. He is blunt, direct
and conveys an air of simplicity and sincerity.266
The apparently conflicting policies between the State Depart-
ment and the Pentagon are also demonstrated during July and
August 1994, when the State Department was sending a human
rights investigator Robert Gersony behind RPF lines to surrep-
titiously investigate crimes committed by the same RPF military
that U.S. troops were supporting in Kigali in mid-July 1994.
263 Steve Vogel, Student of War Graduates on Battlefields of Rwanda: Rebel
Leader Ran a Textbook Operation, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1994.
264 Id.
265 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
266 WAUGH supra note 34, at 222.
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Then, when Gersony reported his findings about RPF crimes to
the State Department, any prior Pentagon support for the RPF
would certainly have been seen as a political and human rights
liability. The fact that the Gersony report was suppressed, and
RPF crimes aggressively covered-up at the ICTR for so many
years, suggests that the exposure of possible Pentagon involve-
ment with the RPF is the sort of motivation that might explain
U.S. policy toward Kagame. If it can be shown that the Penta-
gon had been providing significant support to Kagame before
and during 1994, the U.S., itself, would be directly implicated in
the "Rwanda genocide," along with the RPF.
The possibility that the Pentagon and State Department were
acting at cross-purposes in Rwanda was further confirmed when
the author interviewed former USAID director for Africa in
1994 former Ambassador Brian Atwood, regarding the Gersony
investigation in an attempt to learn why the State Department
would first employ Gersony to investigate RPF human rights
abuses, and then immediately begin to suppress the report once
RPF crimes were uncovered.267 Atwood's role was mentioned in
several of the U.N. documents from August to October 1994,
reporting on reactions to the Gersony report.268
According to Atwood's personal description, the Gersony re-
port became an "inconvenient truth" because the State Depart-
ment had not been aware of the Pentagon's involvement with
Kagame until after the report was received,269 and as the memo
to Warren Christopher of September 1994 and other documents
describe. The State Department documents confirm that the
U.S. embassy may have been aware of the consequences RPF
military superiority no later than 1992,270 but there is no evi-
267 Interview with Brian Atwood, Dean, Univ. of Minn. (Dec. 22, 2007); see
also supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
268 See http://www.rwandadocumentsproject.net, UN documents dated Au-
gust, September, October 1994.
269 Id; see Peter Erlinder, The Rwanda Genocide Cover-up, JURIST, Feb. 19,
2008.
270 See supra text accompanying note 145.
Volume , Number I F al 1o-01
76
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol4/iss1/6
dence that Pentagon representatives reported to the embassy
the meaning of the success of the RPF advance in February 1993
or the extent of Pentagon involvement in the RPF, until the
September 1994 memo from George Moose to Warren Christo-
pher documenting the consequences of this military superiority
in Gersony's report of RPF crimes.271
However, if Kagame or high-level RPF officers are prose-
cuted at the ICTR, it is certain they will be asked to explain how
the RPF's forces grew ten-fold between February 1991 and 1993
in the Virunga Mountains, becoming a more a larger and more
effective light infantry force than Uganda, itself, was capable of
supplying in 1990.272 And, if the RPF was being supplied by the
Pentagon and Kagame is responsible for the mass violence
known as the "Rwandan genocide," Kagame's Pentagon spon-
sors would have much more to answer for than the "failure to
intervene" to which Bill Clinton admitted in his famous mea
culpa in Kigali in 1995.273
Whatever the reason for the U.S. engineered ICTR "cover-
up," it can no longer be sustained and both sides must be prose-
cuted or the ICTR will go down in history as a "sham" tribunal,
with complete justification.
The Costs of Super Power-Imposed ICTR Impunity for Africa
The "cover-up" of RPF crimes began no later than September
1994, when Warren Christopher received notification that the
271 See Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (2004) (testimony of Robert
Flaten); Author interview with senior member of the Kigali Embassy, July 1,
2005 (stating the Kigali Embassy was unable to get Pentagon DIA satellite
photos of the progress of the war between 1990 and 1994 because there were
clouds over Rwanda for three years and the source of funding for armaments
coming from Uganda was a subject off limits even to the Kigali Embassy
senior staff).
272 KINZER, supra note 135, at 65.
273 Davide Heaps, Clinton's Rwanda Apology Wasn't So Candid, NY TIMES,
Mar. 29, 1998.
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RPF was committing mass crimes in areas they controlled well
before having seized power in July 1994.274 The "cover-up" con-
tinued through 1997, when Louise Arbour scuttled the prosecu-
tion of Kagame for the assassination of the two presidents.275
The fact of the "cover-up" became obvious with Carla Del
Ponte's firing in 2003276 and was confirmed in the memoirs of
Del Ponte and Hartmann in 2007-2009.277 And, it can no longer
be credibly denied that the "cover-up" has had the effect of
granting impunity to the Kagame regime for any and all crimes
it has committed since the RPF withdrew to the Virunga Moun-
tains in late 1990, where it underwent its stunning transforma-
tion into a military powerhouse.278 According to the August
2009 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative Report:
The RPF has used an extraordinary amount of vi-
olence, domestically and internationally, in the
pursuit of its illegitimate aims. It is responsible for
killing almost 500,000 persons, whether citizens or
not, and is responsible for the deaths of many
times more through displacement, malnutrition
and hunger... The U.N. has voluminously docu-
mented these practices...
The increasingly well-documented crimes committed by
Kagame's RPF in Rwanda in 1994279 were just the beginning of
the U.S. sponsored impunity enjoyed by Kagame's RPF for
mass crimes committed in Central Africa.
Using the "Rwandan genocide" as justification, the armies of
Rwanda and Uganda invaded the Congo in 1996 and 1998,
where they continue to occupy large areas many times bigger
274 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (1998) (Defense Exhibit DT-
264).
275 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
276 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
277 Id.
278 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
279 Faul, supra note 249.
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than Rwanda that Congolese forces are unable to prevent. 280
Reports to the Security Council in 2001, 2002, 2003,281 and De-
cember 8, 2008,282 explain that stolen Congolese resources ex-
plain the relative prosperity in Kigali and the fortunes being
made by insiders in the Rwandan and Ugandan governments. 283
This ongoing Rwandan "rape of the Congo" is well known in
both the Security Council, and in high-level government circles
in Washington, D.C.284 According to former State Department
Undersecretary for Africa Hermann J. Cohen, who met with
Kagame and Habyarimana during service to the first Bush ad-
ministration, prior to 1994:
.. from 1996 to today, the Tutsi-led Rwandan gov-
ernment has been in effective control of Congo's
eastern provinces of North and South Kivu. This
control has been maintained through intermittent
military occupation and the presence of Congolese
financed and trained by the Rwandan
Army.. .During these 12-years of Rwandan con-
trol, the mineral-rich provinces have been eco-
nomically integrated into Rwanda.285
280 "Rwanda President Paul Kagame's Washington Visit," February 1,
2001, Human Rights Watch at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2001/02/01/
rwanda-president-paul-kagames-washington-visit.
281 U.N. Security Council Panel of Experts, Illegal Exploitation of National
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1027 (Oct. 20,
2003).
282 U.N. Security Council Panel of Experts, Illegal Exploitation of National
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth form the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, delivered to the Security Council, (Dec. 8, 2008); Michelle Faul &
Todd Pittman, Fears Rise of Wider Conflict in the Congo, Ass. PRESS, Nov. 4,
2004; Jeffrey Gettleman, Rwanda Stirs Deadly Brew of Troubles in the
Congo, NY TIMES, Dec. 3, 2008.
283 Adam Hochschild, The Dark Heart of Mineral Exploitation in Congo:
Back on the Brink II, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 24, 2004, at 6.
284 Gettleman, supra note 282.
285 Herman J. Cohen, Can Africa Trade its Way to Peace?, INT'L HERALD
TRIBUNE, Dec. 17, 2008, at 6.
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While this article was being edited, the New York Times and Le
Monde leaked copies of the 600-page "mapping report" pre-
pared by the staff of the High Commission for Human Rights,
which describes in detail massive crimes committed by the RPF
across the border from Rwanda in the Congo between 1993 and
2003.286 Incredibly, this report was provided to Kagame and the
RPF in draft form more than six months before its official re-
lease.287 The final report was published October 1, 2010, but dif-
fers in only minor respects from the "leaked" version.288
Preventing significant modifications in the report, some com-
mentators have concluded, was the whole purpose for leaking
the draft.289
The Costs of ICTR Impunity: Prospects for Damage to
U.S. Influence
There are some signs that the costs of the U.S's unwavering
support for Kagame and the RPF may be getting too high. Presi-
dent Kagame was re-elected in August 2010 with 93% of the
vote, about the same percentage he received in 2003. Like the
2003 election,290 the 2010 election was accompanied by arrests of
opponents, the outlawing of political parties, and mysterious
murders and disappearances. 291 What was very different was the
White House's reaction, which unlike 2003, did not congratulate
Kagame:
... a series of disturbing events prior to the elec-
tion including the suspension of two newspapers,
286 Faul, supra note 249; see also Report on Democratic Republic of Congo,
supra note 50; see also DRC: Mapping Human Rights Violations 1993-2003,
supra note 53.
287 Stearns, supra note 7.
288 Faul, supra, note 249.
289 Stearns, supra note 7.
290 Reyntjens, supra note 171, at 182-187 (discussing 2003 election
conditions).
291 See supra notes 272-275 and accompanying text.
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the expulsion of a human rights activists, the bar-
ring of two opposition parties from taking part in
the election, and the arrest of journal-
ists... [S]tability and prosperity will be difficult to
sustain without broad political debate and open
political participation. . ." Democracy is about
more than holding elections. .. 292
The White House statement was welcome and long overdue, but
left out other "disturbing events" like the murder of a leading
journalist 293 investigating the attempted assassination of a for-
mer Chief of Staff seeking asylum in South Africa,294 the be-
heading of the vice-chair of an opposition party,295 the arrest of
my former client, Victoire Ingabire for "genocide denial," 296 and
my own arrest. 297 As this article is being written, Rwanda has
Madame Ingabire in custody on charges of terrorism and has
announced its intention to prosecute the leading figure in the
film Hotel Rwanda, Paul Rusesabagina, on charges of terror-
ism. 298 Rwanda has also announced its intention to charge me
292 Statement on the National Elections in Rwanda, The White House, Au-
gust 13, 2010 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2OlOIO8/13/state-
ment-national-elections-rwanda.
293 Josh Kron, Rwanda Editor Who Accused Officials in Shooting is Killed,
NY TIMES, June 25, 2010.
294 Rwandan General Shot in S. Africa, NY TIMES, June 19, 2010; see also
Rwanda ex-army chief Nyamwasa shot in Johannesburg, BBC NEWS, June 19,
2010.
295 Josh Kron, Rwandan Opposition Leader is Found Dead, NY TIMES, July
14, 2010; see also Ann Garrison, Rwandan Green Party Leader Beheaded, S.F.
BAY VIEW, July 14, 2010.
296 Jeffrey Gettleman & Josh Kron, Presidential Candidate is Arrested in
Rwanda, NY TIMES, Apr. 21, 2010; see also Kagame Rival Arrested in
Rwanda, BBC NEWS, Apr. 21, 2010.
297 Gettleman & Kron, supra note 4.
298 Edmund Kagire & Jason Straziuso, Rwanda Says it Will Charge Hotel
Rwanda Manager for Aiding Arrested Opposition Politician, Assoc'D PRESS,
Oct. 27, 2010.
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with genocide denial and to issue worldwide INTERPOL war-
rants if my lawyers advise me not to return to Rwanda.299
In light of my arrest, the White House's reference to "stabil-
ity" did have the ring of irony, given that C.I.A. (Central Intelli-
gence Agency) reports indicate that Rwanda's 6,000 pre-
Kagame troops now number at least 65,000 (plus uncounted
para-militaries and militias)-troops comprised of members as
young as 16 carrying AK-47's.30oMoreover, the Rwandan "pros-
perity" referenced by the White House, comes from military oc-
cupation of the Congo and the theft of some $250 million in
natural resources each year.30 1 In the year 2000, the added value
of blood diamonds and minerals plundered from the Congo
amounted to 190% of Rwanda's military budget and 110% of
the publicly acknowledged aid received from foreign donors. 3°2
This at the cost of more than 5-million lives, according to former
State Department Africa experts30 3 and U.N. Security Council
Reports30 4 The U.S. has also given $1 billion in aid since 2000,
$250 million more for 2010-11, plus Pentagon and off-the-books
aid, NATO aid, and payments for troops on U.N. and AU
"peacekeeping missions" in Darfur.30 5
For more than 15 years, the U.S. has calculated that its unwa-
vering protection of RPF has been worth the political cost, no
299 Id.; Author's note: On October 6, 2010, the ICTR Appeal Chamber
granted a motion to enjoin Rwanda from continuing my prosecution, but the
response of Rwandan Prosecutor Ngoga was the threat to redraft the charg-
ing documents and to issue another charge based solely on writings posted on
the internet, rather than mentioning arguments in court.
300 Military-I Trial, ICTR Case No. 98-41-T (2004) (Defence Exhibit DB71)
at 12.
301 Hochschild, supra note 283, at 6.
302 Reyntjens, supra note 171, at 190.
303 Cohen, supra note 285.
304 UN Report (Oct. 16, 2002), supra note 234; UN Report (Oct. 20, 2002),
supra note 50; UN Report (July 15, 2004), supra note 237; UN Report (Dec.
12, 2008), supra note 53.
305 Ban Urges Rwanda Not to Withdraw UN Peacekeepers, BBC News (Sept.
8, 2010), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-l1229201.
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matter what the RPF's crimes. But as the evidence mounts that
the "Rwanda genocide" did not happen the way the victor says
it happened;306 as it becomes clear that the ICTR trials have
been manipulated to serve U.S. foreign policy interests;307 as the
crimes of the RPF in Central Africa become more widely
known;30 8 and, the U.S. "cover-up" more widely exposed 30 9, the
continuing cost to the United States, in terms of its ability to
play the role of "honest broker" in Africa, will be enormous. By
manipulating international institutions like the ICTR to "target"
governments whose interests diverge from the United States,
while conferring immunity on much more notorious criminal en-
terprises, the United States is not only "ridiculing principles of
international justice," as Carla Del Ponte recognized:
"It is unfair that politics undermines our work [at
the ICTR]. I find it wounding to see that we have
managed to ridicule the principles of international
justice. . .. because Kagame has signed a bi-lateral
agreement [with the United States]."310
But, it is also ensuring that Africans be unlikely to look to the
U.S. for principled relations on which African nations can de-
pend for a very long time.311
On a more fundamental level, the now-apparent use of both
the ICTR and the ICC to reward America's "friends of the mo-
ment," and to "demonize" those with whom it disagrees, makes
reconciliation of African conflicts between peoples who must
306 See infra.
307 See Del Ponte infra.
308 Faul, supra note 249.
309 Peter Erlinder, The Great Rwanda Genocide Cover Up, CENTRE FOR RE-
SEARCH ON GLOBALIZATION, Sept. 3, 2009, http://www.globalresearch.ca/in-
dex.php?context=va&aid=8137; Peter Erlinder, The Rwanda War Crimes
Cover Up: UN Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte Has Confirmed the Cover Up,
CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALIZATION, Sept. 3, 2009, http://www.
globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=15037.
310 HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 271-72.
311 Mamdani, supra note 29.
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find ways to live together far more difficult to achieve, as it in-
serts super power interests and resources into one side of the
conflict or the other. The consequence of the tribunal mecha-
nism, particularly one underwritten by a superpower, is to force
one contestant to shoulder the "blame" for the conflict, rather
than recognizing that many, if not most, conflicts in Africa have
deep roots that do not lend themselves to identifying a first
cause.
One only need imagine the consequences for South Africa
had the U.N. Security Council established an International
Criminal Tribunal for South Africa, in which the United States
exercised behind-the-scenes influence as it has at the ICTR, to
ensure that only members of the apartheid regime were held re-
sponsible for crimes committed during the struggle for majority
rule. Of course, the picture would have been much worse had a
minority government composed of a former aristocracy been im-
posed by force upon a majority, which was then demonized by
the "myth of the victors" and wrongfully damned by a foreign
dominated international tribunal and cover-up of the crimes of
the victors, as has occurred in Rwanda.
CONCLUSION
The Obama administration has taken an important first step
toward rectifying the U.S.'s backing of a one-sided ICTR by not
granting legitimacy to the illegitimate Kagame election. A next
step should be ending U.S. protection for Kagame and his RPF
forces at the U.N. Tribunal for the crimes they are known to
have committed before, during and after the Rwandan geno-
cide. Whether because the U.S. is complicit in the "Rwandan
genocide," or because of honest policy errors, the U.S' use of
the ICTR to cover-up the crimes of the RPF must stop and a
foundation for the acceptance of mutual responsibility by both
sides in the Rwanda War needs to be established. Once there is
truth...reconciliation at least has a chance.
Volume , Number 1 Fai 11210
84
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol4/iss1/6
